A Crisis Made in Japan

Jeff Kingston

In Japan there is a proverb, 'If it stinks, put a lid on it.' Alas, this seems to have been Toyota's approach to its burgeoning safety crisis, initially denying, minimizing and mitigating the problems involving brakes that don't brake and accelerators that have a mind of their own. President Akio Toyoda, grandson of the founder, was MIA for two weeks and the company has appeared less than forthcoming about critical safety issues, risking the trust of its customers world-wide.

This has been a public-relations nightmare for Toyota, as its brand name has been synonymous with quality and reliability. Crisis management does not get any more woeful than this and the cost of this bungling so far-the initial $2 billion recall and the loss of 17% of share value since Jan. 21, when the gas-pedal recall was announced-is only a down payment on the final tally. The recall will surely expand, including cars produced in Japan. Lawsuits are being filed and an expensive settlement looms. And then there are the idle factories and empty showrooms to account for.

It is not surprising that Toyota's response has been dilatory and inept, because crisis management in Japan is grossly undeveloped. Over the past two decades, I cannot think of one instance where a Japanese company has done a good job managing a crisis. The pattern is all too familiar, typically involving slow initial response, minimizing the problem, foot dragging on the product recall, poor communication with the public about the problem and too little compassion and concern for consumers adversely affected by the product. Whether it's exploding televisions, fire-prone appliances, tainted milk or false labeling, in case after case companies have shortchanged their customers by shirking responsibility until the accumulated evidence forces belated disclosure and recognition of culpability. The costs of such negligence are low in Japan where compensation for product liability claims is mostly derisory or non-existent.

One glowing exception to this parsimonious record is the saga involving pharmaceutical companies that kept selling tainted blood products to hemophiliacs that left many of them infected with HIV in the 1980s. The government was aware of the issue and failed to stop this avoidable public health crisis. After years of denial, the current finance minister, Naoto Kan, who was health minister in 1994, revealed documents showing that the government allowed the companies to continue selling the bad blood so that they would not lose market share to foreign companies selling safe blood products. In doing so he paved the way for a relatively generous settlement and an abject apology by drug company executives, collectively on hands and knees touching their noses to the floor in demonstrating their contrition to victims.

Usually, however, producer interests trump consumer safety.

Japanese firms often seek to cover up or fudge the facts and the people communicating with the media and public often do not have the information they need to do their job. The absence of a structure to quickly get accurate information to top management hampers an accurate and adequate response. That leaves management unprepared to deal with media questioning and conveys an image of stonewalling and indifference.

There is a cultural element to this penchant for mismanaging crisis. The shame and embarrassment of owning up to product defects in a nation obsessed with craftsmanship and quality raises the bar on disclosure and assuming responsibility. And a high-status company like Toyota has much to lose since its corporate face is at stake. The shame of producing defective cars is supposed to be other firms' problems, not Toyota's, and the ongoing PR disaster reveals just how unprepared the company is for crisis management and how embarrassed it is. In addition, employees' identities are closely tied to their company's image, and loyalty to the firm overrides concerns about consumers.

There is also a culture of deference inside corporations that makes it hard for those lower in the hierarchy to question their superiors or inform them about problems. The focus on consensus and group is an asset in building teamwork, but also can make it hard to challenge what has been decided or designed. Such cultural inclinations are not unknown elsewhere around the world, but they are exceptionally powerful within Japanese corporate culture and constitute significant impediments to averting and responding to a crisis.

This crisis offers an opportunity to reform Toyota's corporate culture and improve quality assurance. This can be done by becoming more focused on the customer, using two-way flow of information and feedback; improving corporate governance by appointing independent outside directors; and making risk management more than an afterthought. It is not too late to turn the situation around, but this means shedding the constraints of a fusty corporate culture and wowing customers with a recall and above-and-beyond after-sales service and care. Yet early signs are that Toyota is no longer the nimble company that took the world by storm over the past half-century.

When Mr. Toyoda took the helm in mid-2009 he was unable to express a reassuring sense of how he would deal with his company's problems of overcapacity as well as the need to diversify away from reliance on the U.S. market and build its presence in China, India and Brazil. A string of successes, most notably the Prius, may have made the juggernaut a bit complacent, losing the edge that helped it surge since the 1970s by being ahead of the curve on fuel efficiency and top of the class on reliability. Regaining that edge and repositioning the company to tap into growing markets promises to be a difficult transition.

The Japan Inc. model of cooperative and collusive relations between the business and the government delivered the economic miracle, but has run out of steam. Japan's Lost Decade of the 1990s is entering its third decade, discrediting the powers that be.

Voters threw the long-ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party out of office last year and have warmed to the Democratic Party of Japan's attacks on those in power and their extensive influence. The public wants fresh thinking about Japan's staggering problems ranging from its rapidly growing disparities, high poverty rate (above 15%), youth unemployment and marginal employment, and a low birthrate attributed to a family-unfriendly environment. But the DPJ has lost traction, caught up in money scandals reminiscent of the venal era of LDP rule. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama faces demands for more transparency and accountability, a yearning that also extends to the corporate world.

With Japan Airlines filing for bankruptcy, a public debt-to-GDP ratio reaching 200%, troubles brewing with the U.S. alliance, and even the sumo world sullied by the controversial retirement of a Mongolian grand champion, Toyota's woes add to the staggering 2010 misery index. National self-confidence has been flagging for some time, but amidst the prolonged malaise, people could still bask in the success of national champions such as Toyota. No other company better represented manufacturing prowess than Toyota and its troubles are an unpleasant surprise.

Americans used to say that what is good for General Motors is good for the country and what is good for the country is good for GM, highlighting the prominence of American car culture and how public and private interests were conflated. Now that Toyota has many factories, employees, suppliers and dealers in the U.S., it's worth recalling that mutual interests are at stake in rectifying these safety problems and putting Toyota back on track.

In Japan, the media has taken something of a minimalist approach to this story. Here on its home turf, Toyota seems to have been much more successful in managing the news than it has been in the U.S. and both the media and government have been more circumspect. On Friday, however, the outspoken transport minister, Seiji Maehara, pointedly said that Toyota had denied there is a problem and in his view the company was insufficiently sensitive to consumer complaints. Yet unlike his American counterparts, he has not authorized an inquiry into the safety defects.

Also on Friday, Mr. Toyoda finally held a press conference, two long weeks since the U.S. gas pedal safety recall was announced. At the conference, Mr. Toyoda tried to rescue the situation by apologizing for the inconvenience to customers around the world. The company ascribes the alleged brake problems to customers misunderstanding the feeling of the ABS braking system and says that only the 2009 model Prius is involved. Since January, the company has fixed the software so that the ABS responds more quickly.

This press conference was an unsuccessful attempt to reassure customers and blunt the impact of hearings scheduled for Wednesday in the U.S. Clearly, Toyota is trying to avoid a safety recall in Japan and is lobbying the government to permit a voluntary repair program that involves less stigma and cost. The company's insistence that there is no defect, just a software glitch, rings hollow and does little to regain trust and restore confidence. Prius is a critical model driving sales for Toyota and questions about its braking system and other safety defects linger.

Initially, the safety defects were portrayed as a made-in-America problem, but now the design defects have hit home, raising new questions about Toyota's famous quality control circles. Had this story not come out in the U.S. it is doubtful whether Toyota would have even considered a recall at home. But now, as international coverage of quality problems expand, the domestic media here have their backs covered and are likely to start asking some of the same questions and raising some of the same issues, if more politely.

Much is at stake for the company and the nation as Toyota tries to restore its reputation. There have been an alarming number of cases in recent years in which Japanese products have not met the high quality standards that the world and its own people expect of it. In some quarters this is seen as a barometer of a nation in decline, one that is adrift and slipping.

Japan can ill-afford complacency about the quality of its products and stagnant productivity especially given its demographic time-bomb. A population that is aging and declining at the same time is one that needs to do more with less. It needs to raise added value and per capita output to support a growing elderly population and its pension and medical care needs. And this means keeping up with competitors such as South Korea, which are ready to displace Japan wherever it falters. A resurgent Toyota is a good-news scenario that can mean a lot to the battered national psyche and help restore Japan's reputation as a manufacturing powerhouse where the attention to detail is a hallmark rather than a question mark. Here is betting that Toyota will turn this around, reinvigorating its fortunes and inspiring a nation badly in need of inspiration.

(Jeff Kingston is director of Asian Studies at Temple University Japan. His book 'Contemporary Japan: History, Politics and Social Change' is due out in September.)


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丰田问题凸显日本制造危机

Jeff Kingston


日本有句谚语：“要是闻着发臭，那就盖上盖子。”（眼不见为净。）丰田汽车公司(Toyota)似乎就在以这种方式处理其日益凸现的汽车安全问题。对于不能刹车的刹车以及颇有“主见”的油门，丰田起初是否认，然后想大事化小，后来又百般推托。公司总裁丰田章男（Akio Toyoda)是丰田创始人的孙子，在危机发生的头两周成了失踪人员，公司对重大汽车安全问题的反应似乎不再那么积极，有负全球消费者对其的信任。

对丰田来说，这是一场公共关系的噩梦，因为长久以来，丰田品牌一直是品质和可靠性的代名词。再也没有比这更糟糕的危机管理了，到目前为止，丰田已为此付出20亿美元的召回费用，公司股价自2010年1月21日（当天丰田宣布因油门踏板问题实施召回）以来下跌17%，而这些仅是丰田最后要承担的巨额损失的首付款而已。召回规模肯定会扩大，将包括在日本生产的汽车；丰田已面临多起法律诉讼，未来可能要付出高昂代价才能解决；而闲置的工厂和空荡荡的汽车专卖店展示区同样意味着巨大的经济损失。

丰田的反应如此迟钝笨拙倒也不足为奇，因为在日本，危机管理在很大程度上还未发展起来。过去二十年来，我根本想不出来有哪家日本企业在危机管理上做得不错。每家公司的反应都差不多，一开始反应迟钝，想大事化小，小事化了，在产品召回上拖拖拉拉，就所存在问题与公众的沟通少得可怜，对因产品问题而遭受影响的消费者漠不关心。无论是爆炸的电视机、易燃的家用电器、变质的牛奶和错误的标签内容，这些企业一次又一次地欺骗消费者，逃避其应负的责任，直到问题越来越多，证据确凿，它们才姗姗来迟，承认问题的存在。这种漠视消费者的做法并不会给企业带来很大的损失，因为日本在产品责任诉讼方面的赔偿额度较低，有时甚至没有。

在这方面，唯一的例外是发生在20世纪80年代的“毒血事件”。当时日本制药企业长期将受到污染的血液制剂卖给血友病患者，导致他们中的许多人患上艾滋病。日本政府明知问题存在，却没有采取措施制止这场本可避免的公共卫生悲剧的发生。在抵赖多年后，日本现任财相、当时的厚生大臣菅直人(Naoto Kan)在1994年公开相关文档，显示政府当时允许制药企业继续销售受污染的血液制剂，以免将市场份额拱手让给那些销售无污染的血液制剂的外国公司。菅直人的这一做法为相对慷慨的赔偿方案奠定了基础，并促使那些制药企业的高管向受害者磕头忏悔。

不过，一般来说，日本将制造商的利益置于消费者的安全之上。

日本企业往往试图掩盖或捏造事实，负责与媒体和大众打交道的人往往无法获取应有的信息。机制的缺失导致企业高管层无法迅速获取精准的信息，进而影响其反应的准确性和有效性。管理层在面对媒体质询时准备不足，因此会给人一种推诿搪塞和冷漠无情的印像。

日本人在危机管理方面的劣势也有其文化因素。这个国家一直以其产品的精良做工和一流品质为傲，在产品出现缺陷时羞于承认，从而导致更难披露信息和承担责任。像丰田这样的知名企业尤其如此，因为认错就意味着公司的颜面尽失，损失巨大；汽车的质量问题应该发生在其他公司身上，而不是丰田公司。丰田正在经历的公关灾难表明，其毫无危机管理的准备，处于一个多么尴尬的境地。此外，在日本，员工形像与公司形像紧紧拴在一起，因此他们对公司的忠诚度超过了其对消费者利益的关注。

Bloomberg
丰田汽车总裁丰田章男上周五在日本出席一个记者招待会时低头鞠躬。
日本企业还有一种服从上级的文化，导致下层员工很难质疑上级的举动，很难把存在的问题如实告知上级。注重一致意见和集体利益的团队精神既是一笔财富，也令人们难以挑战业已做出的决定和计划。这种文化倾向在全世界各地都很常见，但在日本企业文化中尤为突出，严重阻碍了企业的危机规避能力以及反应能力。

这次的危机为丰田改革企业文化和提高品质管控提供了一个契机，实施途径包括更加注重消费者权益、建立信息双向沟通和反馈机制、通过任命外部独立董事来优化企业治理结构，以及将风险管理从事后转向事前等。现在亡羊补牢，还为时未晚。然而，这意味着企业要挣脱陈腐文化的桎梏，向消费者提供超预期的优秀售后服务和客户关怀；但目前的迹象显示，丰田已不再是半个世纪前横扫全球市场的那个灵活多变的公司了。

2009年中，丰田章男开始执掌丰田公司，当时未能对公司存在的诸多问题提出解决方案，如产能过剩、过于依赖美国市场，如何在中国、印度和巴西确立市场地位等。此后的一系列成功，尤其是丰田普锐斯(Prius)混合动力汽车，也许让这家汽车巨头有点洋洋得意，失去了令丰田从70年代起开始腾飞的那种优势，即始终在燃油经济性和质量可靠性方面处于行业领先地位。重拾这一优势并对公司重新定位以进入新兴市场，这必将成为丰田的一种艰难转型。

日本企业与政府共存共荣的关系是实现日本经济快速发展奇迹的重要因素，但好汉不提当年勇，日本自90年代“失去的十年”(Lost Decade of the 1990s)后，现在已进入第三个十年期，但经济依然低迷，人们不禁质疑企业与政府的那种关系是否还有效果。

2009年，长期执政且较为保守的自民党(Liberal Democratic Party)在选举中下台，取而代之的日本民主党(Democratic Party of Japan)对官商勾结的社会现象发起冲击。日本公众希望看到政府对一些长期得不到解决的问题有全新的思考，如日益加大的贫富分化、高贫困率（超过15%）、年轻人失业和不稳定就业问题，以及因缺乏鼓励组建家庭的良好政策环境所导致的低生育率等问题。然而，日本民主党渐渐失去斗志，陷入金钱丑闻难以自拔，让人不禁联想起自民党执政期间同样腐败的时代。日本民众要求首相鸠山由纪夫(Yukio Hatoyama)促使政府更加公开透明和尽职尽责，这种要求也延伸到企业身上。

日本航空公司(Japan Airlines)申请破产保护、日本公债占GDP的比重达到200%、与美国盟友之间酝酿的纠纷、日本相扑大满贯冠军蒙古人阿龙涉嫌比赛舞弊宣布退役，这些事情都为日本的2010年笼罩上一层阴影，而丰田丑闻又给其添上了不光彩的一笔。日本的国民自信心长久以来处于风雨飘摇之中，但丰田这样的成功企业尚能给他们带来一丝慰藉。没有哪家企业能像丰田那样代表日本制造能力的巅峰，正因如此，丰田遭遇的危机给日本人带来沉重的意外打击。

美国人以前常说：对通用汽车有好处的事，对美国也有好处；对美国有好处的事，对通用汽车也有好处。这句话彰显出美国汽车文化的主流地位，以及公众和私人利益如何错综复杂地交织在一起。丰田在美国有很多工厂、员工、供应商和汽车代理商，因此在丰田质量安全问题上，美日有着共同利益所在，丰田重回正轨对双方都有好处。

日本媒体对丰田危机的报导极尽简约之能事。丰田在本土的危机公关能力似乎比在美国更强大，日本媒体和政府对此事的态度也更为谨小慎微。不过，2010年2月5日，说话一向直言不讳的日本国土交通大臣前原诚司(Seiji Maehara)点名指出，丰田公司曾否认存在质量问题，因此他认为该公司对消费者投诉的敏感度不够；但与美国方面不同的是，他没有授权发起对丰田产品安全隐患的调查。

同一天，丰田章男终于召开新闻发布会，这距离丰田公司因油门踏板安全问题在美国发出召回公告已有两周时间。丰田章男试图做一些补救工作，为此事给全球消费者带来的不便致以歉意。然而，公司将刹车问题归因于消费者对ABS电子刹车系统使用感受的不当理解，表示只有2009年生产的普锐斯存在此类问题；自2010年1月起，公司已解决了相关软件问题，让ABS刹车系统的反应更加快速。

这场新闻发布会并不成功，既没有给消费者带来安抚，也未能缓和计划于2010年2月10日周三在美国举行的听证会给公司带来的不利影响。很明显，丰田公司试图避免在日本本土对其产品展开安全召回，正在游说政府通过一个自愿修复计划，以减少人力物力的成本支出。丰田仍坚称其产品没有缺陷，只有软件方面的小毛病，这种空谈对重筑消费者信心毫无裨益。普锐斯是丰田汽车销量的重要支柱，而人们对其刹车系统以及其他一些安全缺陷的疑虑依然没有消失。

起初，安全缺陷仅被视为在美国生产的丰田汽车所存在的问题；但现在，因设计缺陷引发的安全隐患问题已经扩展到日本本土，引起人们对丰田著名的“品管圈”(quality control circle)理念的质疑。如果这次的问题不是发生在美国而是在日本，我们很怀疑丰田公司是否会在本土发出召回公告。但现在，由于国际媒体对该问题的报导越来越多，日本国内媒体有了一些底气，说不定也会开始问同样的问题，尽管选择的方式可能更温和一些。

虽然丰田正试图挽回恶劣影响，但该公司乃至“日本制造”这一金字招牌都可能受到很大冲击。近年来，日本产品已有不少质量问题出现，未能达到全世界消费者及日本国民所预期的高质量标准，这足以引起人们的警觉。从某种意义上讲，这种现象是一个国家步入衰退、风雨飘摇的征兆。

日本的产品质量以及停滞不前的生产力无法令人感到满意，尤其是其人口趋势正蕴含着一个定时炸弹。这个国家日趋老龄化，同时人口数量持续减少，因此不得不用更少的投入换取更多的产出。日本需要提高产品的附加值，提高人均产量，才能支持一个不断老龄化的人口群体，应付由此产生的养老和医疗问题。这意味着日本必须跟上韩国这类对手的步伐，后者正在日本竞争力削弱的各个领域取而代之。丰田如能走出目前的困境，对日本的国民心理将是莫大的支撑，也有助于挽回“日本制造”的声誉，不至于让“关注细节”从日本的一个国家品牌沦为一个国家问题。这是一场豪赌，赌丰田能否力挽狂澜，实现复兴，激励一个急需鼓励的国家再度前行。

（本文作者杰夫•金斯顿(Jeff Kingston)是美国天普大学日本分校(Temple University Japan)亚洲研究中心主任，所着的《当代日本：历史、政治及社会变化》(Contemporary Japan: History, Politics and Social Change)计划于2010年9月出版。）