Published: August 21 2009 14:41
Neon lights lining a street in China
In the past decade China has become the workshop for the world, its low-cost labour force toiling in factories to churn out cheap goods destined for western consumers. Many of the raw materials needed to feed this industrial juggernaut have to be imported from other countries and today China is the biggest driver of markets in commodities such as copper, oil and iron ore.
But as well as a multitude of low-paid factory workers, the country’s manufacturing boom has also created a large and growing number of baofahu – literally, the “suddenly wealthy”. Their shopping habits and changing tastes are reshaping global trade flows at the other end of the production chain.
The rise of the Chinese consumer has provided unprecedented opportunities for enterprising global corporations and many now look to the country as their biggest growth market for the indefinite future. And while China’s nouveaux riches share many of the tastes of their counterparts in any other part of the world, there are also a number of customs and cultural legacies that have created new markets for products that have little value elsewhere. This has encouraged global companies to invest an increasing amount of time and money in understanding what makes the Chinese customer special and how best to market or customise products.
In some cases, traditional Chinese tastes, combined with the explosion in wealth during the past decade, have created a rapacious and unsustainable call for the body parts of endangered species. The manufacture of traditional delicacies, ornaments and medicinal ingredients has helped to cut swathes through populations of sharks, elephants, seahorses and other species across the world – and that demand is only expected to increase.
Jamil Anderlini, FT deputy Beijing bureau chief
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Big cars, flashy cars
An illustration of a yellow car neon signIn the US, cars need giant cup-holders, but in China, it’s chauffeurs that are de rigueur. So when Porsche recently decided to launch a four-door sedan in the midst of financial Armageddon, it chose to do so in China – perhaps the last place on earth where anyone still has RMB2.5m (£200,000) to spend on a chauffeur-driven sports car.
At the Shanghai auto show in April, the Porsche Panamera – which offers the ample legroom required by China’s back-seat-riding bosses – premiered alongside the Geely GE, otherwise known as the Baby Rolls-Royce (much to the displeasure of the real Rolls-Royce). Then came news that China plans to buy Hummer and make it greener. China’s love affair with big, flashy autos is clearly just beginning.
The newly wealthy everywhere love to flaunt their money, but China’s rich are even more shameless than most: cars are not a means of locomotion for the affluent Chinese, they are a symbol of success, status and the naked power of the internal combustion engine over the bicycle or pedestrian.
According to Friedhelm Engler, director of design for GM’s Shanghai-based Pan Asia Technical Automotive Center, cars in China are all about “face”. He says the bulky, “three-box” shape that is still overwhelmingly popular is deeply embedded culturally in a country where the rich traditionally rode in palanquins. To western eyes, that makes many Chinese cars look old-fashioned, especially on the futuristic streets of Shanghai, with its space-age skyscrapers. And parking such cars – not to mention parking a “Baby Rolls” – is a nightmare in the city’s congested, narrow streets.
China needs smaller cars, and some younger consumers are leaning toward hatchbacks; but in a country where grandpa or dad is often footing the bill, four doors still often win out over five (not least because grandpa or dad may not know how to drive, so they rely on the younger generation to squire them around at weekends in the three-box). This is a world where the young can start their motoring life with a Buick, not a 2CV or Beetle; Buicks are more popular in China than they have been in the US for decades.
But western car manufacturers are betting that things will change, as China’s budding love affair with the automobile matures. The country is on track to become the world’s largest auto market this year – several years ahead of expectation – and car styles could be transformed at the speed of light. “Chinese consumers are used to moving quickly, from no TV, to a flatscreen,” says Engler. Their auto style may be dowdy today – but in China, tomorrow is always just around the corner.
Patti Waldmeir, FT Shanghai correspondent
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Gold
An illustration of a neon sign with three gold barsChina loves gold in all its forms: as a reserve currency, jewellery, an investment – even gold that is not real at all, or “virtual gold”, the internet commodity used as currency in online games such as World of Warcraft. The Chinese government is trying to crack down on trade in virtual gold, which is “farmed” by online gamers in China and sold to online gamers in the first world.
But when it comes to the real stuff – gold jewellery and gold bullion, for either adornment or investment – trade in China has risen sharply. Beijing recently revealed that it had been secretly buying gold for years in order to diversify its foreign reserves, and had almost doubled its bullion holdings. But they are not the only ones: the rising tide of wealth among middle-class Chinese has made China the second-largest gold jewellery market in the world since 2007, behind only India. Sales of gold and silver jewellery in China rose by an astounding 28.7 per cent in May year on year – proof, if any more were needed, that Chinese consumers have certainly not stopped spending money during the financial crisis. Total gold demand in China last year was nearly 400 tonnes, up by 21 per cent from 2007.
But Chinese people like their gold purer than their western counterparts: 24 carat, rather than 18 carat. The reasons for that, says Shi Heqing, gold analyst at Beijing Antaike Information, are partly historical: “Chinese people have gone through several wars in the last century, and the memory of those is still fresh, so they like secure ways of keeping their money. In the west, people seem to use gold more for decoration or beautification.”
The recent rollercoaster ride in the mainland stock market – which at one point last year had fallen by 70 per cent from its 2007 height, but has since crawled back to half the peak level – has also prompted more investment interest in gold in bullion form, gold market analysts say.
Mr Yu, a 55-year-old antiques trader in Shanghai who declined to give his first name, says he bought 500g of gold in 2007 and increased his holding to 2,000g at the end of last year. “I know people who are still buying stocks at this moment … but gold may be better for people my age who are more risk-averse.”
Or as Shaun Rein, managing director of China Market Research in Shanghai, puts it: “In China, the banking system has only recently become stable. Chinese people like gold: you can always melt it down and it’s easy to carry.”
Patti Waldmeir, with additional reporting by Yan Jin, former FT Shanghai news assistant
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Barbie
An illustration of Barbie as a neon signNo one knows more about shopping than the women in the Shanghai typing pool: all those one-child babies have grown up into over-indulged 20-somethings with office jobs and 100 per cent disposable income. Their parents or grandparents pay for rent, food, healthcare and every other human need; all the rest goes on clothes, shoes, make-up and … Barbie?
Mattel is banking on Shanghai’s girlie-girls to revive its flagging fortunes. The biggest Barbie store in the world recently opened on the city’s Huai Hai Zhong Lu shopping street, where all six floors are infused with the spirit of that 1960s model of female perfection, the blonde and cinch-waisted doll whose brand must rank as one of the greatest successes in the history of world marketing.
But in China, Mattel is breaking that brand mould in a big way: Barbie is supposed to transform herself from a doll into a lifestyle. Nearly a whole floor of the store is devoted to Barbie clothing in grown-up sizes – exorbitantly priced sequined tops that my American eight- and nine-year-old girls would not be caught dead in because Barbie (to them) is a little kid thing. But Shaun Rein of China Market Research says “cute sexy” is what the typing pool wants, and judging from the huge popularity of the Hello Kitty character in that age group, it might just work.
Jinky Gu, spokeswoman for the Shanghai store, has another perspective altogether. “Chinese parents won’t stop investing in their children’s education even during the economic crisis.” The notion that Barbie is an educational toy might horrify the feminists among us, but it just might work among the stiletto-heeled Shanghainese. It would not be the first time that a jaded western brand got a new lease of life in China.
Patti Waldmeir, FT Shanghai correspondent
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Spirits and fine wine
An illustration of a bottle and glass of wine as a neon signShanghai White is the latest product offering from Diageo, the UK drinks business behind such brands as Johnnie Walker and Guinness, and its launch this summer gave the world a glimpse of how the tastes of China’s new rich are changing the liquor landscape.
Shanghai White is being marketed as premium vodka but it is produced in a venture with a Chinese baijiu distillery, combining the distilling process of both vodka and baijiu. The “but” in there is because baijiu is the national firewater in China, with a taste sometimes described as a mixture of tequila and dirt.
Of the roughly five billion litres of spirits consumed every year in China, the vast majority is baijiu; the combined consumption of all foreign spirits is estimated at less than 1 per cent of the total. The allure of such a large market has convinced Diageo that it needs to adjust its product line.
In the wine market, meanwhile, bottles of Château Lafite and Louis XIII are indispensable accoutrements for display in the gleaming new mansions of China’s super-rich, although such badges of wealth are more likely to be seen as investments. The cachet of ordering an expensive bottle also still far outweighs the pleasure derived from drinking it, and Chinese nightclubs are filled with wealthy people ordering top-shelf cognac then mixing it with gallons of sweet, green-tea-flavoured soft drinks.
Only around 5 per cent of grape wine consumed in China is currently imported but this is changing and at numerous recent European wine auctions the winning bidder has been Chinese. While European winemakers have not yet contemplated changing their products to suit Chinese tastes, the marketing strategies of wine dealers are already shifting eastward.
Jamil Anderlini, FT deputy Beijing bureau chief
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Ivory
An illustration of an elephant's head as a neon signFor more than 7,000 years, Chinese artisans have been crafting elephant ivory. Favoured by the Imperial household as far back as the Qing dynasty (1680), ivory has an illustrious reputation and an association with the wealthy and elite. But in 1989, the trading of ivory was banned worldwide through the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (Cites), after more than half of Africa’s 1.3 million elephants were poached in a single decade. And yet, with a carving trade established in antiquity and a burgeoning middle class who, for the first time, can afford to buy ivory, China remains its biggest importer.
As Asian elephant herds dwindle, African elephants have become the only source of ivory. In late 2008, Cites authorities allowed China to bid with Japan for tusks from official stockpiles – consisting of ivory collected from elephants that had died a natural death – in four southern African countries. In an open declaration of a continuing demand, 12 Chinese traders bought 62 tonnes at an average price of $144 per kilo. Since this legal purchase, more than 11 tonnes of illegal African ivory have been impounded en route to China.
Elephant poaching largely takes place in central Africa, where poverty and political instability are rife. Chronic unemployment, the availability of firearms and corruption all facilitate the illegal ivory trade. These regions are also home to unregulated domestic ivory markets, where carved items are bought and sold. According to ivory expert Esmond Martin, the majority of buyers are Chinese. In a scramble for Africa’s minerals and resources, the continent has seen a recent influx of Chinese workers – a presence that is visibly reflected in the illegal retailing of ivory. On a recent trip to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Martin recorded 1,433 items of ivory openly displayed in the city’s main streets and central market. Among these were 149 pairs of freshly carved ivory chopsticks, selling for $16 each – in sharp contrast to a Chinese retail price of $139 – and signature stamps and jewellery. All of these items were small enough to potentially smuggle through customs.
Martin had previously estimated that 4,900 to 12,000 elephants from central Africa were killed each year to supply tusks to the craftsmen of Africa, China and Thailand. Conservationists are deeply concerned. According to Barbara Maas, CEO of Care for the Wild International: “With the number of Chinese nationals resident in Africa rising, and poaching on the increase, the frontline between supply and demand for ivory is now perilously close, with a disastrous outcome for elephants.”
Rose Gamble, freelance journalist
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Dairy
An illustration of a bottle of milk as a neon signThe Chinese have become the second-biggest consumers of milk globally, after Indians. Demand has been helped by Beijing bombarding the populace with health messages about the benefits of dairy, by urbanites adopting more western diets and by rising incomes. Dairy consumption in China has doubled since 2000, and reached some 30 million tonnes in 2007, according to Rabobank, the food- and agriculture-focused bank.
International dairy producers got a further boost last year in the form of China’s milk and infant formula contamination scare, which led to two death sentences for men involved in deliberately tainting the country’s milk supply with the chemical melamine. “China’s milk powder imports have more than doubled since the melamine crisis,” says Tim Hunt, senior dairy analyst for Rabobank. “It played a huge role in shoring up market prices for internationally traded products in the first half of 2009.”
Nevertheless, at just 22kg per head each year, China’s dairy consumption falls well short of wealthier Asian countries such as Japan (where people eat some 75kg of milk, cheese, ice cream and yoghurt each year) and is piddling next to European Union residents, who consume 223kg each year. Still, foreign dairy groups see potential in the Chinese market. Although consumption fell in the wake of the melamine scare, it is expected to return close to pre-crisis levels by the end of the year.
Meanwhile, MilkLink, the UK dairy co-operative, this year became the first British cheese maker to export Stilton to China, targeting urban Chinese as well as western expats. The company’s cheeses, which will soon include English cheddar, are being sold in supermarkets along the country’s east coast, including branches of Tesco and Wal-Mart. Simon Mercer, head of export at The Cheese Company, part of MilkLink, claims natural cheeses will be the next big growth story in China’s dairy sector, a forecast backed up by research group Zenith International. It says cheese consumption, currently less than 4 per cent of the country’s dairy market, will rise alongside the expansion of fast food chains such as Pizza Hut and McDonald’s.
As the dairy sector grows, Mercer forecasts China will “suck in” imports, but warns that the UK – where milk production is in decline – is not in a position to meet demand.
Jenny Wiggins, FT consumer industries correspondent
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Dried seahorses
An illustration of a seahorse as a neon signThe aphrodisiac counter is always the most arresting section in the menageries that are Chinese medicine shops. Among the eyes of newts and toes of frogs are mounds of dried seahorses. In traditional Chinese medicine, consuming seahorses is thought to be beneficial for human kidneys, improving memory, reducing swelling, helping women give birth, treating arthritis and even curing breast cancer. But the most important function of the humble hippocampus is the treatment of impotence. Maybe it has something to do with the fact that seahorses are the only known vertebrate species for which males rather than females give birth. Or maybe it’s just because they are so exotic.
For most of the past 1,000 years, only the richest Chinese patients could afford to include seahorses in their love potions. But with industrialisation, rapacious modern fishing techniques and China’s economic renaissance, dried seahorses have become widely available and are even sold pre-packaged by the dozen in supermarkets across the country.
Chinese consumers demand up to 250 tonnes of dried seahorses annually, but populations in China’s own territorial waters have been so depleted that only 10-20 tonnes a year can be sourced domestically. The remainder is imported from places such as Vietnam, the Philippines, India and Africa. And because dried seahorses weigh so little, 250 tonnes is equivalent to tens of millions of seahorses killed every year for Chinese aphrodisiacs – figures so enormous that even some in the Chinese medicine industry have started to voice concern that this precious ingredient will soon be fished into extinction.
The obvious answer? Farming seahorses. But attempts to do so on a commercial scale have so far had little success.
Jamil Anderlini, FT deputy Beijing bureau chief
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“Penny pinching, ruthless, suspicious shoppers”
A Chinese man shops for trousers in a department storeHail the Chinese consumer, putative saviour of the global economy, writes Sameena Ahmad. China is still growing, at an enviable 8 per cent clip, and within that retail sales are rising by 15 per cent and more each year. The country now boasts more millionaires than the UK and glossy malls to serve them are springing up even in tawdry third- and fourth-tier cities. Parched of profits at home, a growing number of multinational corporations are betting on China’s billion-strong army of shoppers to bail them out and the rest of the world.
But in order to sell successfully to the Chinese, you have to understand them – and too many international companies (still) don’t. While the country is growing richer rapidly, the absolute numbers remain relatively small. Total consumer spending in China reached $1,700bn in 2007, according to the most recent figures available, compared with $12,000bn in the US. In new research on the Chinese consumer to be published next month, McKinsey, the management consultancy, classifies just two million households out of a population of 1.3 billion as “wealthy” and that is based on fairly modest annual earnings of more than $30,000. The mass middle class is certainly growing and numbers some 70 million urban households, but these still earn just $5,000-$10,000 a year. That buys western shampoo, Ikea furniture and a television, but not many cars or diamonds.
The current healthy growth in retail sales is also not as good as it looks. Government purchases at retail stores are included in the figures and in many cities, including Beijing, the government has also been helping indirectly by handing out vouchers to finance purchases of anything from computers to weddings. The big spender in China, in years past and even more so today, is the state: private consumption as a percentage of gross domestic product has fallen from 60 per cent in 1968 to 36 per cent last year and could be as low as one-fifth in 2009 as the government ramps up capital investment.
In fact, the Chinese, who already have a world-beating savings rate of nearly 40 per cent of their income, tend to become more frugal when times are tough. As bank deposit rates decline, most of us spend more. The Chinese tend to stash away even greater sums to make up for the lost interest. The reason for this conservatism is the lack of a social safety net in China – citizens have to provide for their own medical care, old age and possible unemployment.
This makes them “penny pinching, ruthless, suspicious shoppers”, says Tom Doctoroff, north Asia director of advertising agency JWT and a writer on Chinese consumer trends. In a recession this behaviour only grows worse. “The downturn has made people keener on finding the cheapest deal,” says Yuval Atsmon, an associate principal in McKinsey’s Shanghai office. Even when they can easily afford it, buying a PC typically involves six visits to a store, and more often than not, customers will wait six months before making their decision after consulting blogs, online comparison sites and – the most important source of information in China – friends and family. Sales of copycat mobile phones, with all the functions of top models but a lower price, have soared from 17 million units in 2006 to 62 million units last year.
Brand consciousness is high, at least in the big cities, but brand loyalty is much lower than in the west. A price cut or good in-store promotion can often sway shoppers. And for cultural reasons, appealing to an individual’s taste or personal comfort typically doesn’t work, Doctoroff points out. A purchase either has to publicly signal status or wealth, like a flashy car does. Or provide a practical benefit: the latest craze in China is chocolate with added calcium, eaten not for pleasure but for the health benefits. The growing appeal of diamonds to women is not based on romance, but as a financial signal of a man’s commitment. Trust is another key issue in a country where so many consumer products are faked. Chinese mothers, for example, will pay 30 per cent more for safe baby milk – and this should favour foreign brands.
But foreign retailers and manufacturers have to cope with vast regional differences in demographics, language and culture that make it hard to plan a single marketing strategy – indeed treating China like a single country is usually a mistake. Natives of Zhejiang on the east coast like “toilet roll as rough as sandpaper”, the former head of Wal-Mart China liked to observe, a penchant thankfully absent elsewhere. Atsmon points out that cities even an hour apart can be entirely different: in southern Shenzhen, more than four-fifths of the population consists of migrant workers, mostly under the age of 35, who speak Mandarin and drink in bars. In nearby Guangzhou, migrants number just over a quarter, more people are older, enjoy watching Cantonese TV and go out to restaurants to drink with family members. Adequately addressing such niches requires an army of local suppliers, costly infrastructure and several layers of wholesalers and intermediaries. Even then, success may remain as elusive as it always has been: “No matter what you may be selling, your business in China should be enormous, if the Chinese who should buy your goods would only do so,” lamented Carl Crow, an advertising executive in Shanghai and author of the original book on how to sell to the Chinese … more than 70 years ago.
Sameena Ahmad is a business writer for The Economist
中國消費大趨勢
過去10年，中國變成了世界工廠，廉價勞動力在工廠中辛勤工作，大量生產為西方消費者定做的廉價商品。這個勢不可擋的工業巨頭所需的許多原材料都必須從其它國家進口，因此在銅、石油和鐵礦石等大宗商品市場，中國如今已成為最大的推動者。
但除了眾多的低薪工人外，中國的制造業繁榮還催生了大量數量仍在繼續增長的暴發戶。他們的購物習慣和不斷變換的品味正在重新構筑生產鏈另一端的全球貿易流。
中國消費者的崛起為雄心勃勃的跨國企業提供了前所未有的機遇，許多企業現在都將中國視為它們在無限期的未來最大的增長市場。雖然中國新富的品味與世界其它各個地方的新富有許多共同之處，但也有許多習俗和文化傳統為在其它地方幾乎沒有價值的產品創造了新市場。這鼓勵了跨國公司不斷增大時間和資金的投入，去了解中國客戶的特殊之處以及如何才能最好地營銷或定制產品。
有時候，傳統中國口味和過去10年財富的激增，滋生出對瀕危物種身體部位貪婪而不可持續的需求。傳統美食、飾品及藥材的制作，助長了對鯊魚、大象、海馬和世界上其它物種的捕殺，而這種需求預計只會增長，不會下降。
吉密歐(Jamil Anderlini)，英國《金融時報》駐北京記者
大型車、豪華車
在美國，汽車需要特大號杯托，而在中國，司機則是必需。因此，當保時捷(Porsche)最近決定在金融末日戰爭期間推出一款4門轎車時，它把地點選在了中國——這里可能是地球上最后一個還有人會花250萬元人民幣購買配備司機的跑車的地方。
在今年4月的上海車展上，保時捷Panamera和吉利卓越(Geely GE)一同首次公開亮相。前者有坐在后排的中國老板想要的寬大伸腿空間，后者被稱作小勞斯萊斯(Rolls-Royce)（這令真正的勞斯萊斯非常不高興）。接著又傳出消息稱，中國計劃購買悍馬(Hummer)，并令其變得更為環保。中國對大而豪華車的強烈喜愛顯然才剛剛開始。
每個地方的新富都愛炫耀自己的財富，但中國的富人比大多數人都更沒羞沒臊：對中國的富人而言，汽車不是代步工具，而是成功、地位和內燃機凌駕于自行車或行人之上的赤裸裸的權力的象征。
通用汽車(GM)上海泛亞汽車技術中心(Pan Asia Technical Automotive Center)設計總監殷福瑞(Friedhelm Engler)表示，汽車在中國完全是“面子”問題。他說，笨重的“三廂”車受歡迎程度仍然占據壓倒性優勢，這在文化上與中國富人坐轎子的傳統非常契合。在西方人眼里，這讓許多中國汽車看上去很過時，尤其是在上海新潮的大街上和超前的摩天大樓之間。而在上海狹窄而擁擠的街道上，停放這類車簡直就是噩夢，更別提“小勞斯萊斯”了。
中國需要更小的汽車，也有一些較年輕的消費者偏愛掀背車；但在一個常常由爺爺或爸爸付賬的國家，4門車還是經常戰勝5門車（特別是爺爺或爸爸可能不會開車，因此要依賴較年輕的一代用三廂車在周末帶他們出去兜風）。這是一個年輕人可以從別克(Buick)、而不是2CV或甲殼蟲(Beetle)開始其駕車生活的世界；別克在中國比在美國的數十年都更受歡迎。
但西方汽車制造商深信，隨著中國對汽車的熱愛從萌芽走向成熟，情況將會發生改變。今年，中國有望成為全球最大的汽車市場——比預期早了好幾年，因此喜愛的汽車類型也有可能在一夜之間發生轉變。殷福瑞說：“中國消費者已經習慣了快速發展，從沒有電視，一下子到液晶。”他們的汽車車型或許現在很落伍—— 但在中國，明天總是就在拐角處。
帕提•沃德米爾(Patti Waldmeir)，英國《金融時報》駐上海記者
黃金
各種形式的黃金中國都喜歡：儲備貨幣、首飾、投資，甚至是“虛擬黃金”——《魔獸世界》(World of Warcraft)等在線游戲中當作貨幣使用的網絡商品。中國政府正在努力打擊虛擬黃金交易，即中國在線玩家將“耕種”的虛擬黃金倒賣給第一世界的在線玩家。
但提到實物黃金——用作飾品或投資的黃金首飾和金條——這類交易在中國得到大幅增長。中國政府最近披露，為了使外匯儲備多元化，中國多年來一直在秘密購買黃金，所持金條增加了近一倍。但他們不是唯一的黃金購買者：由于中國中產階級財富的不斷增加，2007以來，中國已成為全球第二大黃金首飾市場，僅次于印度。今年5月，中國金銀首飾銷量同比增幅達到驚人的28.7%——縱然沒有其他證據，這也能說明中國消費者在金融危機期間肯定沒有停止花錢。去年，中國黃金需求總量接近400噸，比2007年增長了21%。
但中國人比西方人喜歡更純的金子：24K而不是18K。北京安泰科信息開發有限公司(Beijing Antaike Information Development)的黃金分析師石和清表示，這其中有一定的歷史原因：“上個世紀，中國人經歷了幾場戰爭，至今仍記憶清晰，所以他們喜歡安全的存錢方式。在西方，黃金似乎更多地是用作裝飾或美化。”
黃金市場分析師們表示，中國內地股市最近過山車一樣的表現——去年一度較2007年的峰值水平下跌70%，而至今已攀升至峰值水平的一半——也增加了人們對金條的投資興趣。
不愿透露名字的55歲上海古董交易員Yu先生表示，2007年，他購買了500克黃金，去年底，他所持的黃金已增加到2000克。“我認識的人里，現在有人仍在購買股票……但到了我這個年紀的人更不喜歡風險，因此黃金可能更好。”
或者，正如位于上海的中國市場研究集團(China Market Research)的董事總經理小山(Shaun Rein)所言：“在中國，銀行體系直到最近才變得穩定。中國人喜歡黃金：你隨時可以將它熔化，而且易于攜帶。”
芭比
要說誰對購物最在行，當屬上海寫字樓里的女性：那些獨生女已長成溺愛過度的20來歲的青年，坐辦公室，所有收入都可以自由支配。她們的父母或祖父母會支付租金、食品、醫療及其它一切生存需求；剩下的錢都用來買衣服、鞋子、化妝品和……芭比？
美泰(Mattel)正寄希望于上海女性化十足的姑娘們重振其萎靡不振的命運。全球最大的芭比店最近在上海的淮海中路購物街開張，所有6層店面到處都洋溢著上世紀60年代那個完美女性榜樣的精神。這個金發碧眼束腰玩偶的品牌必定身居世界營銷史最成功案例之列。
但在中國，美泰正在徹底打破這種品牌模式：芭比估計會從玩偶轉變成一種生活方式。幾乎整整一層店面都擺放著成人款的芭比服裝——定價高昂、滿是亮片的上裝。我8歲和9歲的美國女兒決不會想穿這種衣服，因為（在她們看來）芭比是屬于小孩子的東西。但中國市場研究集團的小山說，“可愛加性感”正是職場女性所想要的，并且從Hello Kitty在這個年齡群中受到的巨大歡迎來看，芭比或許也能成功。
上海芭比店的發言人Jinky Gu有一個完全不同的視角。“即使在經濟危機期間，中國的家長也不會停止對子女的教育投資。”芭比是一個有教育意義的玩具的觀念，可能會讓我們當中的女權主義者感到驚恐，但在穿細高跟鞋的上海人中，卻可能恰恰行得通。人們已經厭倦的西方品牌在中國獲得新生，這并不是第一次。
帕提•沃德米爾，英國《金融時報》駐上海記者
烈酒和葡萄酒
尊尼獲加(Johnnie Walker)和健力士(Guinness)等品牌的英國酒業集團帝亞吉歐(Diageo)今年夏季推出了其最新出品上海白(Shanghai White)，它的登臺讓世界看到了中國新富的口味正在如何改變酒業格局。
上海白被宣傳成是精品伏特加，但它是在一家與中國白酒廠的合資企業中生產的，綜合采用了伏特加和白酒的蒸餾程序。這里之所以用“但”字，是因為白酒是中國人普遍喜歡喝的烈酒，人們有時會用龍舌蘭酒與泥土的混合來形容其味道。
中國每年消費約50億升烈酒，其中絕大部分都是白酒；所有外國烈酒的消費總合估計還不到總量的1%。如此巨大市場的誘惑說服了帝亞吉歐，它必須調整其產品線。
此外，在葡萄酒市場中，拉費堡(Château Lafite)和路易十三(Louis XIII)瓶裝酒是中國超級富豪灼灼生輝的新豪宅中必不可少的展示品，雖然這類財富徽章更可能會被視作投資。點一瓶昂貴的酒帶來的虛榮心的滿足，也仍遠遠超出飲酒獲得的快感。中國的夜總會里面充滿了這樣的富人：點一杯最昂貴的干邑，然后將其混入幾加侖綠茶口味的甜味軟飲料中。
在中國消費的葡萄酒中，目前只有大約5%是進口的。但這種現象正在改變。在歐洲近期舉辦的許多葡萄酒拍賣會上，最終的贏家都是中國人。盡管歐洲葡萄酒生產商尚未開始考慮改變自己的產品，以迎合中國人的口味，但紅酒交易商的營銷策略卻已經向東轉移。
吉密歐，英國《金融時報》駐北京記者
象牙
中國工匠雕刻象牙的歷史長達7000余年。早在清朝時期（1680年），象牙就為皇室所喜愛，它享有盛名，常常會讓人們聯想到富人和精英階層。但由于短短10年間，非洲130萬頭大象中有超過一半遭到獵殺，1989年，通過瀕危野生動植物種國際貿易公約(Cites)，象牙交易在全球范圍內被禁止。盡管如此，由于象牙雕刻品貿易歷史悠久，而中國蓬勃發展的新興中產階層終于買得起象牙了，中國仍然保持是最大的象牙進口國。
隨著亞洲象群日漸減少，非洲大象成了象牙的唯一來源。2008年末，Cites機構批準了中國與日本共同競購4個南非國家的官方庫存象牙。這些象牙是從自然死亡的大象身上收集而來的。12家中國交易商以平均每千克144美元的價格購買了62噸象牙，公開宣示了需求的持續。在這次合法交易之后，已有逾 11噸非法的非洲象牙在運往中國的途中被扣留。
偷獵大象主要發生在充斥著貧困和政治動蕩的中非。長期失業、槍械容易獲得以及腐敗，均助長了非法象牙交易。這些地區也是無管制的國內象牙雕刻品買賣市場的源頭。據象牙專家埃斯蒙德•馬丁(Esmond Martin)稱，絕大部分買家都是中國人。為了爭奪非洲的礦產和資源，最近有大量中國工人涌入非洲大陸——這一現象在非法象牙交易中得到了直觀反映。在最近一次前往埃塞俄比亞亞的斯亞貝巴時，馬丁記下了在該市主要街道和中心市場上展示的1433件象牙飾品，其中有149雙剛刻好的象牙筷子（每雙售價16 美元，與中國139美元的零售價形成強烈反差），還有印章和首飾。這些物品都很小，足夠蒙混過海關。
馬丁以前曾估計，為了向非洲、中國和泰國的工匠提供象牙，中非每年有4900頭到1.2萬頭大象被捕殺。保護主義者對此非常擔憂。國際野生動物關懷組織(Care for the Wild International)首席執行官芭芭拉•馬斯(Barbara Maas)表示：“隨著華裔非洲住民和偷獵行為的增多，象牙供求之間的戰線正危險地日益靠近，將對大象造成災難性的后果。”
羅斯•甘布爾(Rose Gamble)，自由撰稿人
乳制品
中國已成為全球第二大牛奶消費國，僅次于印度。中國政府向老百姓大肆宣傳乳制品有利于身體健康，城市居民更多采納西方飲食，以及收入的增加，都促進了對牛奶的需求。據專注于食品和農業領域的荷蘭合作銀行(Rabobank)表示，2000年以來，中國的乳制品消費翻了一番，2007已達到大約 3000萬噸。
去年，中國的牛奶和嬰幼兒配方奶粉污染恐慌給國際乳制品生產商提供了額外的助力。在此次事件中，兩名男子因故意往牛奶中摻三聚氰胺而被判死刑。荷蘭合作銀行資深乳制品分析師提姆•亨特(Tim Hunt)表示：“自三聚氰胺危機以來，中國奶粉進口增長了一倍以上。此次事件在支撐2009年上半年國際貿易產品的市價方面發揮了巨大作用。”
不過，中國每年22千克的人均乳制品消費量，仍遠低于日本等較富裕的亞洲國家（日本人每年消費約75千克的牛奶、奶酪、冰淇淋和酸奶）；而與歐盟居民每年223千克的消費量相比，更是顯得微不足道。但外國乳制品集團看到了中國市場蘊含的潛力。盡管乳制品消費在三聚氰胺恐慌之后出現了下降，但到今年年底就有望恢復到接近危機前的水平。
與此同時，英國乳業合作集團MilkLink今年成為首家向中國出口斯蒂爾頓奶酪的英國奶酪制造商，目標是中國的城市居民和外國移民。在中國東海岸的各個超市，包括樂購(Tesco)和沃爾瑪(Wal-Mart)的分店，都有該公司的奶酪出售，很快還會包括英式切達干酪。MilkLink旗下The Cheese Company的出口負責人西蒙•默瑟(Simon Mercer)宣稱，天然奶酪將是中國乳制品業的下一個重要增長點，這一預測得到了研究集團國際Zenith (Zenith International)的支持。該公司表示，奶酪消費目前還不到中國乳制品市場的4%，但它將隨著必勝客(Pizza Hut)和麥當勞(McDonald's)等快餐連鎖店的擴張而增長。
隨著乳制品業的發展，默瑟預測中國將“吃進”外國產品，但他警告，牛奶生產正在下降的英國尚未準備好滿足這些需求。
干海馬
在實際上是中藥店的動物展覽中，最引人注目的總是壯陽藥柜臺。一堆堆干海馬擺放在蠑螈眼和田雞腿中間。根據傳統中藥理論，食用海馬具有補腎、增強記憶力、消腫、幫助婦女生產、治療關節炎甚至乳腺癌的功效。但海馬的最重要功能是治療陽痿。也許這是由于海馬是世界上唯一已知由雄性繁衍后代的脊椎動物。也可能只是因為它們長相怪異。
過去1000多年的大多數時間，只有最富有的中國患者才能把海馬作為壯陽藥的配方。如今，隨著工業化程度的提高、掠奪性現代捕魚技術的發展以及中國的經濟復興，干海馬已可以普遍買到，甚至在全國各地的超市都有按打包裝的干海馬出售。
中國消費者每年的干海馬需求高達250噸，但在中國自己的海域，海馬數量已急遽減少，現在每年只有10噸至20噸干海馬源自國內，其余部分需要從越南、菲律賓、印度和非洲等地進口。由于干海馬重量輕，250噸干海馬就相當于每年有數億只海馬被捕殺，用于中國壯陽藥的配制。這一數字是如此龐大，就連一些中國醫藥界的人士也已表示擔憂，這種珍貴的藥材很快會因為人們的捕殺而滅絕。
明顯的解決辦法？人工養殖海馬。但迄今為止，以商業規模養殖海馬的嘗試基本都未取得成功。
吉密歐，英國《金融時報》北京記者站副站長
“小氣、無情、疑慮重重的購物者”
向公認的全球經濟救世主——中國消費者致敬！中國仍在增長，速度達到令人羨慕的8%，其中零售額以每年超過15%的速度增長。如今，中國的百萬富翁的數量已超過英國，即使是在艷俗的三、四線城市，為百萬富翁服務的炫麗購物中心也在拔地而起。越來越多難以在本國贏利的跨國公司，正押注于中國十幾億購物者大軍將幫助它們以及全球其它國家擺脫危機。
然而，要成功地向中國人推銷產品，你必須了解他們——太多的跨國公司（仍）沒有做到這點。盡管中國正在迅速變得富有，但絕對值仍然相對較低。根據所能獲得的最新數據，2007年，中國消費總支出為1.7萬億美元，而美國為12萬億美元。在管理咨詢公司麥肯錫(McKinsey)本月將公布的中國消費者最新研究中，13億中國人口中僅有200萬家庭被列為“富有”，而且計算標準相當低，為年收入3萬美元以上。廣大中產階級肯定在不斷壯大，總計約 7000萬城市家庭，但他們的年收入仍僅有5000至1萬美元。他們會購買西方的洗發水、宜家(Ikea)家具和電視，但汽車或珠寶的購買并不多。
目前零售的健康增長也不像看上去那樣健康。數據中包括政府在零售店的采購，而且在北京等許多城市，通過發放代金券，為購買電腦到舉辦婚禮等各種支出提供資金，政府也間接提供了幫助。過去幾年，中國最大的支出者一直是政府，現在更是如此：私人消費占國內生產總值(GDP)的比例已從1968年的60% 降至去年的36%，隨著政府加大資本投資，今年這一比例可能會降至20%。
實際上，在時局艱難之際，儲蓄率已經居全球之首（近40%）的中國人往往會變得更為節儉。隨著銀行存款利率下調，我們大多數人會增加支出。但中國人往往會存更多錢，以彌補損失的利息。出現這種保守主義的原因是，中國缺乏完善的社會保障體系——國民必須自己負擔醫療、養老以及可能失業的費用。
廣告公司智威湯遜(JWT)北亞主管、曾就中國消費者趨勢撰文的唐銳濤(Tom Doctoroff)稱，這讓他們成為“小氣、無情、疑慮重重的消費者”。在經濟衰退時，這種行為只會變得更糟糕。麥肯錫上海辦事處副董事安宏宇 (Yuval Atsmon)表示：“經濟低迷讓人們更渴望找到最廉價的交易。”即便他們很輕松就能買一臺個人電腦，他們一般也會到商店跑上6趟，而且常常會先咨詢博客、在線比較網站以及——中國最重要的信息來源——家人和朋友，等上6個月再做決定。山寨機（具備高端手機的所有功能，但價格更低）的銷量已從2006年的1700萬部飆升至去年的6200萬部。
中國消費者的品牌意識很高（至少在大城市是如此），但品牌忠誠度遠遠低于西方國家。降價或店內優惠促銷通常都會讓消費者變心。唐銳濤指出，出于文化方面的原因，迎合個人品味或個人喜好的做法通常行不通。人們的購買要么是為了公開顯示自己的身份或財富，就像一部外表華麗的汽車一樣。要么能夠帶來實際的好處：最近中國出現了對加鈣巧克力的狂熱，食用這種商品不是為了享受，而是為了有益健康。鉆石對女性的吸引力越來越強，并不是基于浪漫，而是一個男人實踐承諾的財力信號。在一個如此多消費品是假冒產品的國家，信任是另一個關鍵問題。例如，中國媽媽會多花30%的錢購買安全的嬰兒奶粉——這應有利于外國品牌。
但外國零售商和制造商不得不應對人口、語言和文化方面的巨大地區差異，這讓它們很難制定一個單一的市場戰略策略——實際上，把中國視為一個單一的國家往往是一個錯誤。沃爾瑪中國區前負責人高興地看到，中國東部沿海省份浙江省的人喜歡“像砂紙一樣粗糙的衛生紙”，還好這種傾向沒有在別的地區出現。安宏宇指出，即便是兩座城市相距只有一個小時車程，情況也可能會截然不同：在南方城市深圳，超過五分之四的人口為外來民工，多數年齡在35歲以下，他們說著普通話，在酒吧里喝酒。而在鄰近的廣州，外來人口僅略多于四分之一，更多的人年歲較大，他們喜歡看粵語電視，與家人一起到餐廳喝酒。要充分應對這種小環境，需要一支由本地供應商、昂貴的基礎設施以及多層批發商和中間商組成的大軍。即便如此，成功可能還是像往常一樣難以抓住——上海廣告主管卡爾•克勞 (Carl Crow)曾感嘆道：“不管你賣什么，只要應該購買你的商品的中國人會去購買，你在中國的業務應該就會很大。”克勞曾著述過一本該如何向中國人銷售商品……70多年前。
薩密納•阿邁德，《經濟學人》(The Economist)商業記者。
2009-09-03
A consumer paradigm for China
A more consumer-centric economy would allocate capital and resources more efficiently, generate more jobs, and spread the benefits of growth more equitably. It would also even grow more rapidly.
The development paradigm that brought China two decades of rapid growth and lifted millions of people out of poverty is reaching the limits of its utility. Well before the US credit bubble imploded, China’s leaders recognized that this old economic model, with its heavy reliance on exports and government-led investments, was straining at the seams.1 The global recession that followed Lehman Brothers’ collapse put the model’s drawbacks into sharp relief. When exports plunged, factories closed, and millions of Chinese migrants lost their jobs, Beijing responded with a $600 billion stimulus package and a torrent of new lending by state-owned banks.
But those remedies, while highly successful in restoring short-term growth, risk aggravating structural distortions that made China’s economy vulnerable to external-demand shocks in the first place. As the global crisis ebbs, China’s leaders realize more clearly than ever that they must unleash consumer spending to achieve sustainable growth. Stoking Chinese consumption has vaulted to the top of national—indeed global—policy agendas. But how, and how much, can it be raised?
To answer that question, the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) considered three scenarios for Chinese consumption rates over the next 15 years: a base case (no new action to raise consumption), a policy case (full implementation of proconsumption measures already announced), and a stretch case (a push beyond the current agenda to implement broad changes in the economy’s structure).
MGI estimates that in the base case, China’s consumption will rise to 39 percent of GDP, a gain of just three percentage points above the current level, leaving the country heavily dependent on exports and government-led spending for continued growth. In the policy scenario, consumption could account for as much as 45 percent of GDP, still well below levels in other major economies. If China’s leaders committed themselves to the more aggressive program of comprehensive reform envisioned in the stretch scenario, however, they could raise private consumption above 50 percent of GDP by 2025 (Exhibit 1). Clearing that threshold would bring the consumption rate in line with those in the developed nations of Europe and Asia, vaulting China’s economy into a new phase. McKinsey estimates that comprehensive reform would also enrich the global economy with $1.9 trillion a year in net new consumption, boosting China’s share of the worldwide total to 13 percent—four percentage points higher than its share without further effort.
Reaching the stretch target wouldn’t be easy. China’s leaders will have to wage a sustained policy struggle on many fronts, combining relatively straightforward measures to encourage private spending with fundamental reform of the nation’s health and pension systems and sweeping changes in the economy’s basic structure. Over the next 15 years, China can realistically hope to increase private consumption’s share of total GDP significantly—but only if policy makers depart from the current development paradigm and embrace new policies, structures, and institutions better suited to the country’s status as a large, maturing market economy. That transformation, though daunting, would have a worthy prize: a more stable and fair economy that uses resources more efficiently, creates more jobs, insulates its citizens from foreign-trade shocks, and contributes more substantially to global growth.
China’s constrained consumers
In seeking to bolster private consumption, China’s policy makers face a unique challenge. Although there is no generally accepted standard for “healthy” private consumption in developing economies, in China it is anemic by almost any measure. Private consumption there totaled $890 billion in 2007, making the country the world’s fifth-largest consumer market, behind the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germany (which China recently surpassed as the world’s third-largest economy). But relative to China’s population and level of economic development, its consumers punch far below their weight. The country’s consumption-to-GDP ratio—36 percent—is only half that of the United States and about two-thirds those of Europe and Japan. Indeed, China has the lowest consumption-to-GDP ratio of any major world economy except Saudi Arabia, where oil exports contribute the bulk of economic output (Exhibit 2).
In fact, China’s consumption-to-GDP ratio has dropped by nearly 15 percentage points since 1990 and continues to deteriorate in the aftermath of the financial crisis. While falling consumption rates are common in developing economies, the speed and magnitude of this decline have no precedent in modern history. In the United States, private consumption remained above 50 percent of GDP even during the full-scale industrialization drive of World War II. In Japan and South Korea, consumption remained above 50 percent during periods of rapid industrial development.
The sources of China’s low consumption rate are both behavioral and structural (see “China’s consumption challenge”). The country’s households have an extraordinarily high ability to save: the average Chinese family squirrels away an astonishing 25 percent of its discretionary income, about six times the savings rate for US households and three times the rate for Japan’s. Indeed, China’s savings rate is 15 percentage points above the GDP-weighted average for Asia as a region.
Frugality’s impact is compounded—and in many ways produced—by structural features that restrict consumption’s share of the national income. For one thing, Chinese households command only some 56 percent of it (Exhibit 3), compared with more than 60 percent in Europe and more than 70 percent in the United States. No effort to raise Chinese consumption rates significantly can hope to succeed without addressing the structural factors that both channel income away from consumers and discourage them from spending even their modest share.
Mending the social safety net
Perhaps the most common explanation for the Chinese consumer’s reluctance to spend more freely is the frayed social safety net. Many argue that the country’s consumers oversave and underspend because they lack adequate health insurance and can’t count on government- or employer-sponsored programs to provide for them in retirement (see “Unlocking the power of Chinese consumers: An interview with Stephen Roach”). The relationship between social-welfare programs and private consumption is complex, but the moral imperative to extend health and retirement protections to the millions of Chinese who lack them is clear. Over the long run, mending the social safety net would ease anxieties about the future and bolster consumer confidence.
But MGI believes that better health and pension guarantees wouldn’t raise private consumption significantly before 2025. In assessing their impact on consumer spending, the key question to consider is who pays for them. If enhanced health and retirement benefits were financed through increased or expanded payroll taxes—a virtual certainty—households would feel less pressure to save, but after withholding they would have less money to spend. Thus the primary impact of expanding health and pension programs would be distributive, shifting to middle- and upper-income households the cost of benefits for poor ones. Moreover, any effort to broaden health insurance coverage would probably require a substantial increase in public outlays for medical care and thus raise the government’s share of total consumption.
MGI’s effort to model the reciprocal effects of such changes suggests that, in the aggregate, even a fully fledged program to expand China’s health and retirement benefits wouldn’t raise private consumption’s share of GDP significantly. We estimate that, at best, such improvements would boost it by only a percentage point above the 2025 base-case projection.
Putting products within reach
Measures to make goods and services better and more easily available could encourage consumption much more than would fixing the social safety net. China’s consumer infrastructure is incomplete. Too few products are tailored to the needs of those who would use them. Prices remain high compared with income levels: a Chinese worker toils more than seven hours to buy the same amount of goods and services a US worker earns through only one hour of work. In rural China—home to more than half of the country’s 1.3 billion consumers—organized retail establishments mediate only 18 percent of consumption, compared with 50 percent in urban areas.
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China’s fast-evolving consumer finance market
China’s consumer finance industry lags far behind the economy as a whole. In 2007, consumer finance balances still came to less than 13 percent of GDP, below India and far below Singapore and South Korea. Should recent growth rates persist, consumer lending promises to exceed 8 trillion renminbi ($1.2 trillion) by 2014, up from today’s 3.7 trillion renminbi.1 But that calculation understates the market’s latent potential. If consumer lending on the mainland rose to Taiwan’s level, for instance, the shift could unleash as much as 10 trillion renminbi in net new consumption over the next five years—an enormous opportunity for banks and retailers.
China’s people now have limited credit options. Mortgages account for 90 percent of lending to consumers, who have few choices in key product areas, such as auto loans, credit cards, and personal loans. But the market has grown rapidly in recent years. Credit card issuance is skyrocketing, from 3 million cards in 2003 to 128 million by the end of 2008. Indeed, card issuance could surpass 300 million by 2013. Similarly, unsecured personal loans and installment loans, long the domain of underground lenders, have grown at an annual rate of 33 percent since 2006, to 744 billion renminbi, as leading domestic banks and consumer finance specialists strengthened their risk-management capabilities.
For foreign and local lenders jockeying for position in China’s fast-evolving consumer finance market, we see several keys to success.
1. Recognize the market’s diversity. China is a collection of local markets, each at a different stage of development, with distinct risk profiles and unique consumer preferences. These markets generally evolve through three stages of development: nascent (such as Sichuan), emerging (Jiangsu), and maturing (Shanghai). Lenders should take a portfolio view, focusing on the most promising markets, but with enough diversity to capture the next wave of growth.
2. Find a product portfolio that matches consumer preferences. In a sense, consumer-lending products are fungible. Many consumers balance their savings and borrowing in the aggregate, not by individual products. Some countries (such as South Korea) have high levels of credit card usage; others rely more on cash and personal loans. In the present early stage, the ultimate product balance in China remains to be determined. Finding the right mix may prove crucial to success in China’s fast-growing market.
3. Know the rules and their evolution. New regulations issued by Chinese banking regulators in the spring of 2009 give local and foreign banks and consumer finance specialists greater access to the market, in the form of consumer finance companies. While initially restricted to offering installment loans to retail customers with previous track records in borrowing, such companies will probably enable attackers to participate in the unsecured consumer-lending sector more quickly and at greater scale. In addition, the further deregulation of credit cards has allowed overseas banks to issue renminbi-based ones. These banks should target clear segments and develop the ability to serve the broader market.
Would-be players in such a new market must tread carefully. To assure responsible lending and borrowing, the government must strengthen credit bureaus, improve financial education, support “new to credit” products (for instance, low-limit or collateralized credit cards), and allow consumer finance balances to be securitized. Regulators and lenders must work together to improve risk management, especially the ability to identify and address organized fraud. The government must become better at spotting national and local credit bubbles. China can manage the risks and has ample room to expand consumer credit—safely.
About the Authors
Jan Bellens is a principal in McKinsey’s Shanghai office, where Stephan Bosshart is an associate principal; Dan Ewing is a consultant in the San Francisco office.
Notes
1 This assumes a 2008–14 compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 14 percent for all consumer lending. Taiwan’s ratio of consumer loans to GDP is 29 percent.
Even when high-quality products are readily available, China’s consumers hesitate to buy them on credit. At 3 percent of GDP, outstanding consumer debt in China falls well below that of other large developing countries, such as Brazil, at 12 percent, or Russia, at 7 percent (see sidebar, “China’s fast-evolving consumer finance market”). What’s more, the privatization of China’s housing stock created a powerful new imperative to save: only the most affluent urban families can obtain mortgages, which thus account for just 23 percent of the value of new homes in China, compared with 65 percent in the United States.
Similarly, concerns about financing the cost of a university education drive much of China’s saving: an April 2009 survey of urban Chinese households commissioned by MGI found that this was the number-one reason for it, eclipsing concerns about medical expenses and retirement. In China, local governments provide for primary and secondary education. But surveys suggest that nearly nine in ten Chinese households hope to send their children to colleges, where costs are high relative to incomes—on average, the cost of a university education is nearly half the disposable income of a typical Chinese family. China has two national student loan programs, but only 10 percent of its college students now participate in them.
MGI estimates that, in the aggregate, measures to facilitate consumer spending—through better and more easily available products and expanded access to consumer credit and to financing for a university education—could raise consumption’s 2025 share of GDP by 2.8 to 4.7 percentage points.
Restructuring an investment-centric economy
Over time, a stronger social safety net and improved access to better goods and services will encourage China’s households to save less and spend more. But the country can’t hope to increase its consumption rate meaningfully unless it reverses a major current trend: households have a small and shrinking share of the national income. Any significant rise in household incomes will in turn require far-reaching policy changes that would transform some of the economy’s most basic structures. The fundamental causes of depressed consumption rates are systemic—hardwired into a development model that values investment over household income—rather than unique consumer preferences rooted in culture.
China’s current growth model tilts overwhelmingly in favor of large industrial companies, which typically are state owned or led, benefit from preferential financing from state-controlled banks, and enjoy considerable monopoly power. These features collectively place consumers at a disadvantage and limit employment growth. In any economy, large companies in heavy industry tend to be capital intensive, requiring fewer workers per unit of output than smaller firms in light industries or the service sector. In China, state ownership of heavy industry magnifies this tendency. Such companies, which can count on ready access to capital from China’s big banks and don’t have to pay dividends on state-owned shares, have ample funds to plow back into capital investment. Large, state-led manufacturers tend to have monopoly power in their industries, making it easier to resist pressure from workers for higher wages.
The result is an economy dominated by giant, capital-intensive manufacturers with strong incentives to pile profits back into ever more plants and equipment rather than disburse them to households as dividends or wages. Labor-intensive producers—small and medium-sized enterprises—and the services sector get short shrift. Over the past two decades, the corporate share of China’s national income has risen to 22 percent, up from 14 percent, even as the share of households has fallen to 56 percent, down from 72 percent. Media images of the country’s factories teaming with workers belie the reality: the economy generates too few jobs given its size and rapid expansion. In recent years, employment growth has inched forward at a rate of 1 percent per year even as GDP advanced by double digits.
Ultimately, China can’t hope to unleash the power of its consumers unless the economy creates more jobs and pays higher wages, so regulatory policies must change. Banks should be encouraged to support the services sector as well as small and medium-sized enterprises. Dividend policies for state-owned enterprises should be changed and the development of equity markets encouraged. By 2025, a comprehensive effort to restructure the economy along these lines could add 3.5 to 6.0 percentage points to consumption’s share of GDP.
A fundamental shift
China has already embarked on measures that will shift the focus of its economy away from heavy industry and exports and toward services and consumer products. But two wide gaps remain: between what’s been proposed and achieved and between what’s been achieved and the country’s long-term potential. The government’s stimulus package, by offsetting collapsed overseas demand for Chinese goods with a huge jolt of new domestic public and business investment, has helped the country shake off the global recession’s immediate impact. But the stimulus package does little to tilt the balance in favor of private consumption. In the short term, it will do just the reverse: 89 percent of it is devoted to infrastructure investment, only 8 percent to measures supporting consumption.
A genuine shift away from the old paradigm will require difficult economic and political choices and is sure to meet with opposition. Yet such a shift is undoubtedly in the long-term interest of the nation as a whole. A more consumer-centric economy would allocate capital and resources more efficiently, generate more jobs, spread the benefits of growth more equitably—and grow more rapidly—than China will if it remains on its present course. The narrowing of the trade surplus and the Chinese consumer’s larger contribution to global growth would make foreign ties more harmonious. In years past, China has demonstrated a remarkable ability to make major economic changes rapidly in pursuit of broad national objectives. It can do so again by shifting to a new economic paradigm that unleashes the spending power of its consumers.
中国の消費者
マッキンゼーのクヲータリーレポートに中国の消費者市場に関しての報告が掲載されています。
中国は過去20年間の急激な経済成長により、数億人が貧困から脱し消費をするようになっている。金融危機の中中国の指導者は、旧来型の輸出主導と政府投資にたよった経済モデルの限界を認識した。輸出の不振により工場は閉鎖し、移民工は仕事をなくしている。是に対して中国政府は６０兆円もの景気刺激策を導入し、国有銀行からの新規融資を増加した。
短期的にはこれ等の景気刺激策は成功を収めているが、海外市場に需要が減少することによる影響は大きく、中国政府は継続的な経済成長のためには国内消費を増やす必要性を明確に認識しだした。問題は、どの程度の規模か、そしてそうやって国内需要を増やすのか。
マッキンゼーは、３つのシナリオを想定した。なお、現在中国の国内消費額がGDPに占める割合は37%しかない。是に対しアメリカは71%、日本は 55%、台湾54%、韓国48%、インド57%、ロシア62%、ブラジル65%。シンガポールが40%となっていますが、経済規模を考えると国内消費の少なさが目立ちます。Bricsの中でも最小ですね。
ベースシナリオ：2025年のGDPに対する国内消費が39%。
政策シナリオ： 同上 45%。
ストレッチシナリオ： 同上 50%。
マッキンゼーに寄れば、これは世界の経済にも毎年1.9兆ドルの影響を与えるとの事です。
もちろん、このストレッチゴールを達成する事は容易ではなく、その為には国の健康保険や年金制度の改革を含む経済構造の大幅な改革が必要となる。政府首脳が現在の経済成長モデルを離れ、本気で市場経済を成熟させる必要がある。
中国の消費者市場は、2007年に89兆円と米日英独につぐ世界第５位になっている。しかし、経済は世界第三位であり、中国の人口や経済開発の低を考慮すればまだ低い物に留まっている。中国のGDPに占める消費の割合は、石油輸出が大半を占めるサウジアラビアを除き世界の主要な経済国の中で最低となっている。
中国のGDP対比の消費者市場の占める割合は、1990年より15%も下落し、金融危機の元下がり続けている。開発途上国では経済成長に伴い国内消費の割合が減るのは一般的であるが、中国の場合はその規模、スピード共に前例が無い。アメリカでは第二次大戦中の工業化の時代でも消費がGDPの50%を超えていた。日本と韓国も急激な経済成長の中でも50%を超えていた。
中国の低い消費は、貯蓄性向が高くなんと所得の25%も貯金しており、その割合は米国の６倍、日本の３倍にもなる。また、アジア平均と比べても15%も高い。
一つにはGDPに占める家計所得が56%と、60%以上のヨーロッパや70%を超えるアメリカより低い事にあ（チャートを見ると解りますが、日本の GDPに対する家計所得は元々低く、さらにバブル崩壊中の1994年をピークにどんどん下落して今は中国並みです）。この中国の消費の比率を高めるには経済構造を改革する以外にはない。
多くの人が、中国の消費者が貯蓄に走るのは適切な健康保険制度が無い事、退職後の政府や企業の年金制度をを信頼していない事といわれている。社会保障の未整備と消費が乏しいことの関係は簡単には言えないが、将来の不安の為に貯蓄をしているという事はいえるだろう。
マッキンゼーの予測に寄れば、社会保障の整備は必要ではあるが、それだけでは消費をあげるには不十分である。なぜなら十分な社会保障を行う為には個人所得に対する増税や保険料負担の増加をもたらし、手取り収入を減らすことになり、それは消費を減退させる。そして、国民全部をカバーする健康保険制度は全体消費に占める政府の医療費に対する支出の割合を増やす事になる。その為に社会保障の充実がGDPに占める個人消費の比率を高める割合は低く、2025年でも1%程度と見込まれる。
・商品を消費者の手の届く様にする。
未だに中国の消費者市場は不完全で、商品の価格も所得に比べて高い。中国の消費者はクレジットで物を買うことを嫌い、消費者の借金の比率はGDPの3% しかない。これはロシアの7%、ブラジルの12%と比べても大きく下回る。中国の住宅融資も都市部に富裕層に限られている。
大学教育にかかる費用に対する準備も貯蓄を高める事になる。今年行われた調査によれば、教育費の積み立てが貯蓄の第一の理由とされている。中国では９０％の家庭がその子女に大学教育を望んでいるが、大学教育にかかる費用は年間可処分所得の半分近くになっている。中国にも２種類の学生ローンがあるが、 10%の学生にか供与されていない。
この大学教育に伴うローンを供与することにより、2025年の消費の拡大効果は2.8%から4.8%あるとマッキンゼーは見込む。
・投資主導経済構造の改革
中国の現在の経済成長は、主に国営銀行から資金をふんだんに借り入れられ、かつ独占的地位を保証されている国営大企業により牽引されている。この状況は民間の力を過ぎ、雇用の増大ももたらさない。どこの国でも大規模製造業は投資を必要とし、労働者はそれほど要しないが、中国では特に大規模重工業の比重が高い。そして、これ等大企業が利益を上げ、配当金を株主である国家に納め、その配当金が再投資に回るという構造になっている。国営企業はしばしば独占市場を構成し、労働者に高級を払う事を拒絶する傾向にある。
このような経済構造が、独占的大規模投資を必要とする製造業が、給与や家計支出を助けるよりも、より多くの工場や設備投資に資金を回してしまう。労働集約的な中小製造業やサービス業は不足している、過去20年、中国の国民所得に法人所得が占める割合は22%と14%から上昇し、一方消費者所得は72%から56%まで低下した。経済規模の拡大やスピードに加えると、雇用をさほど生まなかったのはこの構造が背景にある。近年、GDPが10%以上者成長をしているのに、雇用の増加率は１％に留まっている。
中国経済の成長のためには、消費者の購買力を高め、雇用を増やし、給与水準を上げる必要がある。これは、政策方針を変えることを意味し、銀行はサービス業や中小企業向けの資金供与を増やす必要がある。国営企業の配当政策も証券市場の発達とともに変更する必要があろう。もし、この方向で政策を変えるのならば、2025年までに消費を3.5%から6%あげる事ができるだろう。
中国は既に重工業、輸出産業から、サービス業、消費者商品主導の経済への転換を示している。金融危機の元政府主導の経済刺激策が導入され、輸出の不振を上手くカバーしている。しかし、この経済刺激策が民間消費を刺激する比率は少ない。89%はインフラ整備にかかるもので、短期的には効果があるが消費の拡大には8%しか貢献しない
根本的な改革には、経済政策を変える必要があるが反対意見も強いだろう。このような政策転換は、長期的な発展には必要なものであり、もっと消費者主導の経済にするには、資本や資源を効率的に配分する必要がある。そして、それが雇用を増やし、より早く経済成長を促すだろう。
国際収支の黒字幅の縮小と、中国の消費の拡大が世界の経済成長にも貢献し、国際的な調和関係をもたらす事になる。中国は、過去大きな経済改革を進めてきており、国家の目的を達成してきた驚くべき能力が有る。だＫぁら、このシフトも可能な筈だ。
⇒さすがマッキンゼーで、勉強になりました。
一方、このレポートでは楽観的に占めていますが、現実を踏まえると容易に達成できる未知ではない事は、中国事業の関係者なら誰でも思うのではないでしょうか？
普通に考えると、
・消費者主導経済には中々代わらない
・給与格差を埋める為にも国営企業が所得を挙げなければいずれ国家の不安定さがもっとひどくなる。
・一方給与の上昇を進めていくと、低コスト、そこそこの品質の中国製品の輸出機会は年々減少してくる可能性がある。
多分、サービス産業はまだ発展するんでしょうね。所得の高い人が増加していますから。そのサービス産業の担い手の給与がどこまで上がるかはかなり疑問ですけど。
The development paradigm that brought China two decades of rapid growth and lifted millions of people out of poverty is reaching the limits of its utility. Well before the US credit bubble imploded, China’s leaders recognized that this old economic model, with its heavy reliance on exports and government-led investments, was straining at the seams.1 The global recession that followed Lehman Brothers’ collapse put the model’s drawbacks into sharp relief. When exports plunged, factories closed, and millions of Chinese migrants lost their jobs, Beijing responded with a $600 billion stimulus package and a torrent of new lending by state-owned banks.
But those remedies, while highly successful in restoring short-term growth, risk aggravating structural distortions that made China’s economy vulnerable to external-demand shocks in the first place. As the global crisis ebbs, China’s leaders realize more clearly than ever that they must unleash consumer spending to achieve sustainable growth. Stoking Chinese consumption has vaulted to the top of national—indeed global—policy agendas. But how, and how much, can it be raised?
To answer that question, the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) considered three scenarios for Chinese consumption rates over the next 15 years: a base case (no new action to raise consumption), a policy case (full implementation of proconsumption measures already announced), and a stretch case (a push beyond the current agenda to implement broad changes in the economy’s structure).
MGI estimates that in the base case, China’s consumption will rise to 39 percent of GDP, a gain of just three percentage points above the current level, leaving the country heavily dependent on exports and government-led spending for continued growth. In the policy scenario, consumption could account for as much as 45 percent of GDP, still well below levels in other major economies. If China’s leaders committed themselves to the more aggressive program of comprehensive reform envisioned in the stretch scenario, however, they could raise private consumption above 50 percent of GDP by 2025 (Exhibit 1). Clearing that threshold would bring the consumption rate in line with those in the developed nations of Europe and Asia, vaulting China’s economy into a new phase. McKinsey estimates that comprehensive reform would also enrich the global economy with $1.9 trillion a year in net new consumption, boosting China’s share of the worldwide total to 13 percent—four percentage points higher than its share without further effort.
Reaching the stretch target wouldn’t be easy. China’s leaders will have to wage a sustained policy struggle on many fronts, combining relatively straightforward measures to encourage private spending with fundamental reform of the nation’s health and pension systems and sweeping changes in the economy’s basic structure. Over the next 15 years, China can realistically hope to increase private consumption’s share of total GDP significantly—but only if policy makers depart from the current development paradigm and embrace new policies, structures, and institutions better suited to the country’s status as a large, maturing market economy. That transformation, though daunting, would have a worthy prize: a more stable and fair economy that uses resources more efficiently, creates more jobs, insulates its citizens from foreign-trade shocks, and contributes more substantially to global growth.
China’s constrained consumers
In seeking to bolster private consumption, China’s policy makers face a unique challenge. Although there is no generally accepted standard for “healthy” private consumption in developing economies, in China it is anemic by almost any measure. Private consumption there totaled $890 billion in 2007, making the country the world’s fifth-largest consumer market, behind the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germany (which China recently surpassed as the world’s third-largest economy). But relative to China’s population and level of economic development, its consumers punch far below their weight. The country’s consumption-to-GDP ratio—36 percent—is only half that of the United States and about two-thirds those of Europe and Japan. Indeed, China has the lowest consumption-to-GDP ratio of any major world economy except Saudi Arabia, where oil exports contribute the bulk of economic output (Exhibit 2).
In fact, China’s consumption-to-GDP ratio has dropped by nearly 15 percentage points since 1990 and continues to deteriorate in the aftermath of the financial crisis. While falling consumption rates are common in developing economies, the speed and magnitude of this decline have no precedent in modern history. In the United States, private consumption remained above 50 percent of GDP even during the full-scale industrialization drive of World War II. In Japan and South Korea, consumption remained above 50 percent during periods of rapid industrial development.
The sources of China’s low consumption rate are both behavioral and structural (see “China’s consumption challenge”). The country’s households have an extraordinarily high ability to save: the average Chinese family squirrels away an astonishing 25 percent of its discretionary income, about six times the savings rate for US households and three times the rate for Japan’s. Indeed, China’s savings rate is 15 percentage points above the GDP-weighted average for Asia as a region.
Frugality’s impact is compounded—and in many ways produced—by structural features that restrict consumption’s share of the national income. For one thing, Chinese households command only some 56 percent of it (Exhibit 3), compared with more than 60 percent in Europe and more than 70 percent in the United States. No effort to raise Chinese consumption rates significantly can hope to succeed without addressing the structural factors that both channel income away from consumers and discourage them from spending even their modest share.
Mending the social safety net
Perhaps the most common explanation for the Chinese consumer’s reluctance to spend more freely is the frayed social safety net. Many argue that the country’s consumers oversave and underspend because they lack adequate health insurance and can’t count on government- or employer-sponsored programs to provide for them in retirement (see “Unlocking the power of Chinese consumers: An interview with Stephen Roach”). The relationship between social-welfare programs and private consumption is complex, but the moral imperative to extend health and retirement protections to the millions of Chinese who lack them is clear. Over the long run, mending the social safety net would ease anxieties about the future and bolster consumer confidence.
But MGI believes that better health and pension guarantees wouldn’t raise private consumption significantly before 2025. In assessing their impact on consumer spending, the key question to consider is who pays for them. If enhanced health and retirement benefits were financed through increased or expanded payroll taxes—a virtual certainty—households would feel less pressure to save, but after withholding they would have less money to spend. Thus the primary impact of expanding health and pension programs would be distributive, shifting to middle- and upper-income households the cost of benefits for poor ones. Moreover, any effort to broaden health insurance coverage would probably require a substantial increase in public outlays for medical care and thus raise the government’s share of total consumption.
MGI’s effort to model the reciprocal effects of such changes suggests that, in the aggregate, even a fully fledged program to expand China’s health and retirement benefits wouldn’t raise private consumption’s share of GDP significantly. We estimate that, at best, such improvements would boost it by only a percentage point above the 2025 base-case projection.
Putting products within reach
Measures to make goods and services better and more easily available could encourage consumption much more than would fixing the social safety net. China’s consumer infrastructure is incomplete. Too few products are tailored to the needs of those who would use them. Prices remain high compared with income levels: a Chinese worker toils more than seven hours to buy the same amount of goods and services a US worker earns through only one hour of work. In rural China—home to more than half of the country’s 1.3 billion consumers—organized retail establishments mediate only 18 percent of consumption, compared with 50 percent in urban areas.
Toggle Sidebar
China’s fast-evolving consumer finance market
China’s consumer finance industry lags far behind the economy as a whole. In 2007, consumer finance balances still came to less than 13 percent of GDP, below India and far below Singapore and South Korea. Should recent growth rates persist, consumer lending promises to exceed 8 trillion renminbi ($1.2 trillion) by 2014, up from today’s 3.7 trillion renminbi.1 But that calculation understates the market’s latent potential. If consumer lending on the mainland rose to Taiwan’s level, for instance, the shift could unleash as much as 10 trillion renminbi in net new consumption over the next five years—an enormous opportunity for banks and retailers.
China’s people now have limited credit options. Mortgages account for 90 percent of lending to consumers, who have few choices in key product areas, such as auto loans, credit cards, and personal loans. But the market has grown rapidly in recent years. Credit card issuance is skyrocketing, from 3 million cards in 2003 to 128 million by the end of 2008. Indeed, card issuance could surpass 300 million by 2013. Similarly, unsecured personal loans and installment loans, long the domain of underground lenders, have grown at an annual rate of 33 percent since 2006, to 744 billion renminbi, as leading domestic banks and consumer finance specialists strengthened their risk-management capabilities.
For foreign and local lenders jockeying for position in China’s fast-evolving consumer finance market, we see several keys to success.
1. Recognize the market’s diversity. China is a collection of local markets, each at a different stage of development, with distinct risk profiles and unique consumer preferences. These markets generally evolve through three stages of development: nascent (such as Sichuan), emerging (Jiangsu), and maturing (Shanghai). Lenders should take a portfolio view, focusing on the most promising markets, but with enough diversity to capture the next wave of growth.
2. Find a product portfolio that matches consumer preferences. In a sense, consumer-lending products are fungible. Many consumers balance their savings and borrowing in the aggregate, not by individual products. Some countries (such as South Korea) have high levels of credit card usage; others rely more on cash and personal loans. In the present early stage, the ultimate product balance in China remains to be determined. Finding the right mix may prove crucial to success in China’s fast-growing market.
3. Know the rules and their evolution. New regulations issued by Chinese banking regulators in the spring of 2009 give local and foreign banks and consumer finance specialists greater access to the market, in the form of consumer finance companies. While initially restricted to offering installment loans to retail customers with previous track records in borrowing, such companies will probably enable attackers to participate in the unsecured consumer-lending sector more quickly and at greater scale. In addition, the further deregulation of credit cards has allowed overseas banks to issue renminbi-based ones. These banks should target clear segments and develop the ability to serve the broader market.
Would-be players in such a new market must tread carefully. To assure responsible lending and borrowing, the government must strengthen credit bureaus, improve financial education, support “new to credit” products (for instance, low-limit or collateralized credit cards), and allow consumer finance balances to be securitized. Regulators and lenders must work together to improve risk management, especially the ability to identify and address organized fraud. The government must become better at spotting national and local credit bubbles. China can manage the risks and has ample room to expand consumer credit—safely.
About the Authors
Jan Bellens is a principal in McKinsey’s Shanghai office, where Stephan Bosshart is an associate principal; Dan Ewing is a consultant in the San Francisco office.
Notes
1 This assumes a 2008–14 compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 14 percent for all consumer lending. Taiwan’s ratio of consumer loans to GDP is 29 percent.
Even when high-quality products are readily available, China’s consumers hesitate to buy them on credit. At 3 percent of GDP, outstanding consumer debt in China falls well below that of other large developing countries, such as Brazil, at 12 percent, or Russia, at 7 percent (see sidebar, “China’s fast-evolving consumer finance market”). What’s more, the privatization of China’s housing stock created a powerful new imperative to save: only the most affluent urban families can obtain mortgages, which thus account for just 23 percent of the value of new homes in China, compared with 65 percent in the United States.
Similarly, concerns about financing the cost of a university education drive much of China’s saving: an April 2009 survey of urban Chinese households commissioned by MGI found that this was the number-one reason for it, eclipsing concerns about medical expenses and retirement. In China, local governments provide for primary and secondary education. But surveys suggest that nearly nine in ten Chinese households hope to send their children to colleges, where costs are high relative to incomes—on average, the cost of a university education is nearly half the disposable income of a typical Chinese family. China has two national student loan programs, but only 10 percent of its college students now participate in them.
MGI estimates that, in the aggregate, measures to facilitate consumer spending—through better and more easily available products and expanded access to consumer credit and to financing for a university education—could raise consumption’s 2025 share of GDP by 2.8 to 4.7 percentage points.
Restructuring an investment-centric economy
Over time, a stronger social safety net and improved access to better goods and services will encourage China’s households to save less and spend more. But the country can’t hope to increase its consumption rate meaningfully unless it reverses a major current trend: households have a small and shrinking share of the national income. Any significant rise in household incomes will in turn require far-reaching policy changes that would transform some of the economy’s most basic structures. The fundamental causes of depressed consumption rates are systemic—hardwired into a development model that values investment over household income—rather than unique consumer preferences rooted in culture.
China’s current growth model tilts overwhelmingly in favor of large industrial companies, which typically are state owned or led, benefit from preferential financing from state-controlled banks, and enjoy considerable monopoly power. These features collectively place consumers at a disadvantage and limit employment growth. In any economy, large companies in heavy industry tend to be capital intensive, requiring fewer workers per unit of output than smaller firms in light industries or the service sector. In China, state ownership of heavy industry magnifies this tendency. Such companies, which can count on ready access to capital from China’s big banks and don’t have to pay dividends on state-owned shares, have ample funds to plow back into capital investment. Large, state-led manufacturers tend to have monopoly power in their industries, making it easier to resist pressure from workers for higher wages.
The result is an economy dominated by giant, capital-intensive manufacturers with strong incentives to pile profits back into ever more plants and equipment rather than disburse them to households as dividends or wages. Labor-intensive producers—small and medium-sized enterprises—and the services sector get short shrift. Over the past two decades, the corporate share of China’s national income has risen to 22 percent, up from 14 percent, even as the share of households has fallen to 56 percent, down from 72 percent. Media images of the country’s factories teaming with workers belie the reality: the economy generates too few jobs given its size and rapid expansion. In recent years, employment growth has inched forward at a rate of 1 percent per year even as GDP advanced by double digits.
Ultimately, China can’t hope to unleash the power of its consumers unless the economy creates more jobs and pays higher wages, so regulatory policies must change. Banks should be encouraged to support the services sector as well as small and medium-sized enterprises. Dividend policies for state-owned enterprises should be changed and the development of equity markets encouraged. By 2025, a comprehensive effort to restructure the economy along these lines could add 3.5 to 6.0 percentage points to consumption’s share of GDP.
A fundamental shift
China has already embarked on measures that will shift the focus of its economy away from heavy industry and exports and toward services and consumer products. But two wide gaps remain: between what’s been proposed and achieved and between what’s been achieved and the country’s long-term potential. The government’s stimulus package, by offsetting collapsed overseas demand for Chinese goods with a huge jolt of new domestic public and business investment, has helped the country shake off the global recession’s immediate impact. But the stimulus package does little to tilt the balance in favor of private consumption. In the short term, it will do just the reverse: 89 percent of it is devoted to infrastructure investment, only 8 percent to measures supporting consumption.
A genuine shift away from the old paradigm will require difficult economic and political choices and is sure to meet with opposition. Yet such a shift is undoubtedly in the long-term interest of the nation as a whole. A more consumer-centric economy would allocate capital and resources more efficiently, generate more jobs, spread the benefits of growth more equitably—and grow more rapidly—than China will if it remains on its present course. The narrowing of the trade surplus and the Chinese consumer’s larger contribution to global growth would make foreign ties more harmonious. In years past, China has demonstrated a remarkable ability to make major economic changes rapidly in pursuit of broad national objectives. It can do so again by shifting to a new economic paradigm that unleashes the spending power of its consumers.
中国の消費者
マッキンゼーのクヲータリーレポートに中国の消費者市場に関しての報告が掲載されています。
中国は過去20年間の急激な経済成長により、数億人が貧困から脱し消費をするようになっている。金融危機の中中国の指導者は、旧来型の輸出主導と政府投資にたよった経済モデルの限界を認識した。輸出の不振により工場は閉鎖し、移民工は仕事をなくしている。是に対して中国政府は６０兆円もの景気刺激策を導入し、国有銀行からの新規融資を増加した。
短期的にはこれ等の景気刺激策は成功を収めているが、海外市場に需要が減少することによる影響は大きく、中国政府は継続的な経済成長のためには国内消費を増やす必要性を明確に認識しだした。問題は、どの程度の規模か、そしてそうやって国内需要を増やすのか。
マッキンゼーは、３つのシナリオを想定した。なお、現在中国の国内消費額がGDPに占める割合は37%しかない。是に対しアメリカは71%、日本は 55%、台湾54%、韓国48%、インド57%、ロシア62%、ブラジル65%。シンガポールが40%となっていますが、経済規模を考えると国内消費の少なさが目立ちます。Bricsの中でも最小ですね。
ベースシナリオ：2025年のGDPに対する国内消費が39%。
政策シナリオ： 同上 45%。
ストレッチシナリオ： 同上 50%。
マッキンゼーに寄れば、これは世界の経済にも毎年1.9兆ドルの影響を与えるとの事です。
もちろん、このストレッチゴールを達成する事は容易ではなく、その為には国の健康保険や年金制度の改革を含む経済構造の大幅な改革が必要となる。政府首脳が現在の経済成長モデルを離れ、本気で市場経済を成熟させる必要がある。
中国の消費者市場は、2007年に89兆円と米日英独につぐ世界第５位になっている。しかし、経済は世界第三位であり、中国の人口や経済開発の低を考慮すればまだ低い物に留まっている。中国のGDPに占める消費の割合は、石油輸出が大半を占めるサウジアラビアを除き世界の主要な経済国の中で最低となっている。
中国のGDP対比の消費者市場の占める割合は、1990年より15%も下落し、金融危機の元下がり続けている。開発途上国では経済成長に伴い国内消費の割合が減るのは一般的であるが、中国の場合はその規模、スピード共に前例が無い。アメリカでは第二次大戦中の工業化の時代でも消費がGDPの50%を超えていた。日本と韓国も急激な経済成長の中でも50%を超えていた。
中国の低い消費は、貯蓄性向が高くなんと所得の25%も貯金しており、その割合は米国の６倍、日本の３倍にもなる。また、アジア平均と比べても15%も高い。
一つにはGDPに占める家計所得が56%と、60%以上のヨーロッパや70%を超えるアメリカより低い事にあ（チャートを見ると解りますが、日本の GDPに対する家計所得は元々低く、さらにバブル崩壊中の1994年をピークにどんどん下落して今は中国並みです）。この中国の消費の比率を高めるには経済構造を改革する以外にはない。
多くの人が、中国の消費者が貯蓄に走るのは適切な健康保険制度が無い事、退職後の政府や企業の年金制度をを信頼していない事といわれている。社会保障の未整備と消費が乏しいことの関係は簡単には言えないが、将来の不安の為に貯蓄をしているという事はいえるだろう。
マッキンゼーの予測に寄れば、社会保障の整備は必要ではあるが、それだけでは消費をあげるには不十分である。なぜなら十分な社会保障を行う為には個人所得に対する増税や保険料負担の増加をもたらし、手取り収入を減らすことになり、それは消費を減退させる。そして、国民全部をカバーする健康保険制度は全体消費に占める政府の医療費に対する支出の割合を増やす事になる。その為に社会保障の充実がGDPに占める個人消費の比率を高める割合は低く、2025年でも1%程度と見込まれる。
・商品を消費者の手の届く様にする。
未だに中国の消費者市場は不完全で、商品の価格も所得に比べて高い。中国の消費者はクレジットで物を買うことを嫌い、消費者の借金の比率はGDPの3% しかない。これはロシアの7%、ブラジルの12%と比べても大きく下回る。中国の住宅融資も都市部に富裕層に限られている。
大学教育にかかる費用に対する準備も貯蓄を高める事になる。今年行われた調査によれば、教育費の積み立てが貯蓄の第一の理由とされている。中国では９０％の家庭がその子女に大学教育を望んでいるが、大学教育にかかる費用は年間可処分所得の半分近くになっている。中国にも２種類の学生ローンがあるが、 10%の学生にか供与されていない。
この大学教育に伴うローンを供与することにより、2025年の消費の拡大効果は2.8%から4.8%あるとマッキンゼーは見込む。
・投資主導経済構造の改革
中国の現在の経済成長は、主に国営銀行から資金をふんだんに借り入れられ、かつ独占的地位を保証されている国営大企業により牽引されている。この状況は民間の力を過ぎ、雇用の増大ももたらさない。どこの国でも大規模製造業は投資を必要とし、労働者はそれほど要しないが、中国では特に大規模重工業の比重が高い。そして、これ等大企業が利益を上げ、配当金を株主である国家に納め、その配当金が再投資に回るという構造になっている。国営企業はしばしば独占市場を構成し、労働者に高級を払う事を拒絶する傾向にある。
このような経済構造が、独占的大規模投資を必要とする製造業が、給与や家計支出を助けるよりも、より多くの工場や設備投資に資金を回してしまう。労働集約的な中小製造業やサービス業は不足している、過去20年、中国の国民所得に法人所得が占める割合は22%と14%から上昇し、一方消費者所得は72%から56%まで低下した。経済規模の拡大やスピードに加えると、雇用をさほど生まなかったのはこの構造が背景にある。近年、GDPが10%以上者成長をしているのに、雇用の増加率は１％に留まっている。
中国経済の成長のためには、消費者の購買力を高め、雇用を増やし、給与水準を上げる必要がある。これは、政策方針を変えることを意味し、銀行はサービス業や中小企業向けの資金供与を増やす必要がある。国営企業の配当政策も証券市場の発達とともに変更する必要があろう。もし、この方向で政策を変えるのならば、2025年までに消費を3.5%から6%あげる事ができるだろう。
中国は既に重工業、輸出産業から、サービス業、消費者商品主導の経済への転換を示している。金融危機の元政府主導の経済刺激策が導入され、輸出の不振を上手くカバーしている。しかし、この経済刺激策が民間消費を刺激する比率は少ない。89%はインフラ整備にかかるもので、短期的には効果があるが消費の拡大には8%しか貢献しない
根本的な改革には、経済政策を変える必要があるが反対意見も強いだろう。このような政策転換は、長期的な発展には必要なものであり、もっと消費者主導の経済にするには、資本や資源を効率的に配分する必要がある。そして、それが雇用を増やし、より早く経済成長を促すだろう。
国際収支の黒字幅の縮小と、中国の消費の拡大が世界の経済成長にも貢献し、国際的な調和関係をもたらす事になる。中国は、過去大きな経済改革を進めてきており、国家の目的を達成してきた驚くべき能力が有る。だＫぁら、このシフトも可能な筈だ。
⇒さすがマッキンゼーで、勉強になりました。
一方、このレポートでは楽観的に占めていますが、現実を踏まえると容易に達成できる未知ではない事は、中国事業の関係者なら誰でも思うのではないでしょうか？
普通に考えると、
・消費者主導経済には中々代わらない
・給与格差を埋める為にも国営企業が所得を挙げなければいずれ国家の不安定さがもっとひどくなる。
・一方給与の上昇を進めていくと、低コスト、そこそこの品質の中国製品の輸出機会は年々減少してくる可能性がある。
多分、サービス産業はまだ発展するんでしょうね。所得の高い人が増加していますから。そのサービス産業の担い手の給与がどこまで上がるかはかなり疑問ですけど。
2009-09-02
Japan’s continuity we can believe in
日本の「信じられる連続性」
世界的な景気後退が昨年始まった時、日本の経験は欧米にとって恐ろしい教訓になると言われていた。未曾有の経済危機を前に米国や欧州連合（EU）が正しい政策を実行しなければ、欧米も日本のような「失われた10年」を経験し、そのあとも日本のように何年も経済成長率が伸びないおぼつかない状態が続いてしまうのだと、当時よく言われていた。
その日本はここへきて30日の選挙で、50年以上続いた自民党長期政権に決別し、民主党を与党に選んだ。おかげで今や欧米では、新しい「日本がたり」が繰り広げられている。いわくこれは「政治的な革命」なのだとか。あるいはこれで日本は何年も続いた停滞の日々に別れを告げられる、これは日本にとって大きなチャンスなのだとか。
しかしどちらの「日本がたり」も、間違っている。民主党は実は、そこまで大きく日本を変えたりしないだろうし、そうするべきではないからだ。というのも過去20年間の日本の物語は、欧米の論調が言いたがるほど惨めなものでは決してなかったのだから。
確かに1990年に資産バブルが弾けてからというもの、日本経済はのろのろとしか成長せず、株式市場は下落、財政赤字は恐ろしいほどの額にふくれあがった。けれどもこうした困難があったにせよ、日本はその後もずっと正気で、安定していて、豊かで、エキサイティングな国であり続けた。政治的にも文化的にも、そして経済的な意味でさえも、日本は欧米にとって警鐘どころではない。むしろ長く苦しい時代をどうやって乗り越えるかのヒントとなる、日本は見事なお手本なのだ。
相対的な経済停滞が続いている間ずっと、日本の有権者が繰り返し自民党を与党に選び続けたことは、多くの外国人を当惑させた。それは日本がある意味で民主的な国とは言いきれないからだ――などという意見もあった。しかし日本は変わろうとしていた。変わろうとする意志はあった。たとえば日本はあの派手で華やかな小泉純一郎氏を信任したのだ。おかげで小泉氏は2001年から2008年にかけて、日本を以前よりも自由市場主義的な方向へ引っ張ることができた。そして日本は今度は、小泉氏ほどアメリカ流に傾倒していない、鳩山由紀夫氏と民主党を選んだのだ。
しかし日本が変化を選ぶとき、それは常に一定範囲内での変化にとどまるものと相場は決まっている。たとえば欧米の発想からすると、ひどい不況は過激な政治運動を引き起こしかねないという懸念がある。アメリカ政治の論調は時にそれぐらいヒステリックだし、欧州では極右や極左の政党が票数を伸ばしているから、心配するだけのことはある。しかし20年近くにわたる苦しい時代を経ても、日本は一度たりとも、過激主義に浮気することはなかった。
というのも（外国人はなかなか認めようとしないが）、日本は実は言われているよりはずっと上手に、厳しい経済状況に対応してきたからだ。たとえば英「エコノミスト」誌はたびたび、日本の「人をがっかりさせる才能は見事なものだ」などと書いてきた。確かに外国人投資家にとっては、日本の株式市場はここ20年ほど、がっかりする場所だっただろう。なにせバブルのピークには3万9000円をつけていた日経平均株価が、今は1万500円かそこらなのだから。日本人はそのほかにも、いわゆる「死に体」企業をもっと情け容赦なく処理しようとしないとか、いつまでも「終身雇用制度」のような古くさい慣習にしがみついていると、外国人からやたらと非難されてきた。
しかし日本は景気後退の最もひどい社会的影響のショックをなんとか和らげようと努力してきたのであって、その努力はちゃんと成果を出した。確かに先週には世界不況のせいで日本の失業率が過去最悪の5.7％になってしまった、これは大変なことだという論調の見出しが各紙を飾った。しかし5.7％というのは過去最悪と言っても、米国やユーロ圏の9.4％に比べればかなりマシな数字だ。確かにおそらく、公式の失業率の背後には見えない失業が潜んでいるのだろうが、それは欧米でも同じことだ。
日本人は自分たちの職を必死で守ろうとした。だから労働市場はやや硬直的だったし、経済成長はその代償を払う羽目になった……が、それは耐えられないほどの大きな代償ではなかった。学者たちが息せき切って「ジャパン・アズ・ナンバーワン」などと論文を次々と書いていた時代はとっくの昔に終わった。それでも、日本経済は停滞していると20年間言われ続けながらも、日本は未だに世界2位の経済大国なのだ。日本の大企業は未だに、世界で有数の競争力を誇る製品を作り続けている。たとえばトヨタ自動車は、プリウスのように、ハイブリッド自動車の開発で世界をリードしてきた。
そして東京という街はとてもではないが、慢性的な不況に陥っている国の首都とは思えない。東京のレストランはパリよりもたくさんミシュランの星をとりまくったし、フィナンシャル・タイムズのスタイル専門家、タイラー・ブリュレはひたすら東京のあちこちを歩き回っては、最先端のデザインを見つけてくる。日本がいかにスタイリッシュな国か、世界的な評価は正しいのだ。いわゆる「失われた10年」の直後に、日本が2002年のサッカー・ワールドカップを主催した時には、実に明るく、実に温かい歓迎ぶりで世界を迎え入れてくれた。共催国・韓国の薄気味悪い愛国主義とは、嬉しいほどに対照的だったのだ。それに日本人は、サッカーもできる。日本代表は2004年のアジア杯決勝戦のため北京入りして、そして無事に生還してきた。
もちろん日本にも問題はある。平均寿命はひたすら伸び続けていて、人口は減り続けている。日本人の5人に1人は65歳を超えているのだ。民主党は年金の支給額や育児手当を増やすと約束している。加えて減税も。どうやったらその計算が成り立つのか、よく分からない。今の米英は、自分たちの公的債務が国内総生産（GDP）の80％に達してしまいそうだと心配しているのだが、日本の公的債務は200％に近づきつつある。
日本は確かに高齢化社会の問題に取り組もうとしているが、その対策の一部ははっきり言って気持ちが悪い。たとえば日本は、お年寄りの世話をする介護ロボット開発で、世界の先頭を走っている。介護ロボット「よりそいイフボット」は、報道を信じるなら「宇宙服を着て、天気の話をしてくれて、歌を歌い、ゲームをする」のだそうだ。
笑っている場合ではない。アメリカやヨーロッパは今や、バブル経済のその後の惨状に直面し、財政赤字の拡大や団塊世代の大量退職に直面しているのだから。むしろ敬意をこめて日本を見つめるべきだ。日本こそ、自分たちの未来の姿かもしれないのだから。
Japan’s continuity we can believe in
When the great recession began last year, the fate of Japan was often held up as an awful warning to the west. If the US and the European Union failed to adopt the right policies, it was said, they too might suffer a Japanese-style “lost decade”, followed by years of feeble growth.
Now that the Japanese have used Sunday’s election to elect the Democratic party – breaking with more than 50 years of rule by the Liberal Democratic party – a new western narrative is taking hold. This is a political revolution; it is Japan’s big chance to break with the years of stagnation.
But both these stories are wrong. The Democrats are unlikely to shake things up hugely. Nor should they. For the story of Japan over the past 20 years is by no means as dismal as much western commentary would have it.
It is true that, since its asset-price bubble burst in 1990, the country’s economy has grown slowly, the stock market has slumped and national debt has risen to awesome proportions. But, despite these trials, it has remained a sane, stable, prosperous and exciting country. Politically, culturally and even economically, it offers not so much a warning as an inspiring example of how to deal with a long period of adversity.
The fact that, throughout the years of relative stagnation, the Japanese kept electing the LDP puzzled many outsiders. A few even saw it as evidence that Japan is somehow less than democratic. But it was willing to try and change. The country gave a mandate to Junichiro Koizumi, the flamboyant LDP prime minister, who pushed Japan in a more free-market direction from 2001 to 2006. Now it has turned to Yukio Hatoyama and the Democrats, who are less enamoured of the American model.
However, Japan has always gone for change within well-defined limits. Europeans and Americans worry that a deep recession could stoke political extremism – not without reason, perhaps, given the hysterical tone of politics in the US and the increase in the vote for far-right and far-left parties in Europe. But during almost 20 years of tough times, the Japanese have never flirted with political extremism.
That could be because they have coped much better with economic difficulty than foreigners sometimes acknowledge. The Economist, for example, has occasionally lamented Japan’s “amazing ability to disappoint”. It is true that foreign investors will have found the country’s stock market a particularly disappointing venue in the past two decades; the Nikkei currently stands at a little over 10,500, compared with 39,000 at the peak of the bubble. The Japanese have also been chastised by outsiders for their reluctance to deal more ruthlessly with “zombie” companies, and for clinging to outmoded traditions such as “lifetime employment”.
But the efforts to cushion the worst social effects of an economic downturn have paid off. Last week there were shocked headlines proclaiming that the global recession had driven Japanese unemployment to a new high – 5.7 per cent. That still compares pretty favourably to 9.4 per cent in the US and the euro area. There is probably a lot of disguised unemployment behind the official number – but the same is true in the west.
The Japanese determination to preserve jobs made their labour market less “flexible” and the economy paid a price – but not an unbearable one. The days when academics wrote breathless predictions about “Japan as number one” are long gone. But after 20 years of alleged stagnation, it is still number two – the world’s second largest economy. Its biggest companies still make world-beating products. Toyota, for example, has led the world in developing hybrid cars, such as the Prius.
Tokyo certainly does not feel like the capital of a country in the grip of terminal depression. The city’s restaurants have accumulated more Michelin stars than are to be found in Paris. Tyler Brûlé, the Financial Times style guru, prowls the streets of the city, searching relentlessly for examples of cutting-edge design – a tribute to the country’s reputation for style. When Japan hosted the soccer World Cup in 2002, just after its “lost decade”, it presented a cheerful and welcoming face to the world that contrasted pleasantly with the spooky nationalism of its South Korean co-hosts. The Japanese can even play soccer. The national team went to Beijing for the final of the 2004 Asian cup, beat China – and got out of the country alive.
Of course, Japan has its problems. Its average age is rising steadily and its population is shrinking. One in five Japanese is over 65. The Democrats have promised to raise pensions and payments to parents – and to cut taxes. It is hard to see how the sums add up. While the US and the UK worry that their public-sector debts could hit 80 per cent of gross domestic product, Japan’s debt is heading for 200 per cent.
Some of its efforts to deal with an ageing society are positively unnerving. The country has led the world in developing robots as companions for the elderly. These include a “snuggling Ifbot” that, according to press reports, “lives in an astronaut suit, chats about the weather, sings and plays games”.
It is best not to laugh. As the US and Europe struggle to come to terms with the aftermath of a bubble economy, rising public debt and the retirement of the baby-boom generation, they should look to Japan with respect. It may be the future.
日本并未衰落
去年，當這場大衰退開始之際，人們常常把日本的遭遇，作為給西方的一個可怕警告。他們說，如果美國和歐盟(EU)未能采取正確的政策，或許也會遭遇日本式“失落的十年”，其后則是多年的增長疲弱。
如今，當日本人在上周日的選舉中結束了自民黨(LDP) 50多年的統治，把民主黨(DPJ)送上臺時，西方又出現了一種新的說法：此次選舉是一場政治革命，是日本結束多年停滯局面的重大機會。
然而，這兩種說法都是錯誤的。民主黨不太可能大幅改變現狀。他們也不應該這樣做。因為日本過去20多年來的境遇，決不像許多西方人描述得那么悲慘。
誠然，自1990年日本資產價格泡沫破滅以來，該國經濟增長緩慢，股市大幅下跌，國家債務在GDP中所占比例攀升至可怕的水平。但是，盡管面臨這些困難，日本仍然是一個理智、穩定、繁榮和令人激動的國家。就政治、文化、甚至經濟而言，與其說日本提供了一個教訓，不如說它在如何應對長期逆境方面樹立了一個令人鼓舞的榜樣。
令許多局外人感到困惑的是，在經濟陷入相對停滯的多年時間里，日本人始終選擇由自民黨執政。少數人士甚至把這作為日本不夠民主的證據。但日本樂于做出嘗試和改變。它曾選擇個性張揚的自民黨成員小泉純一郎(Junichiro Koizumi)擔任首相，后者在2001年至2006年間，推動日本走向了更高程度的自由市場化。如今，它轉而選擇了不那么迷戀美國模式的鳩山由紀夫 (Yukio Hatoyama)和民主黨。
不過，日本始終是在明確界定的限度內尋求改變。歐洲人和美國人擔心，嚴重的經濟衰退可能會助長政治極端主義——考慮到美國出現的歇斯底里的政治論調，以及歐洲極右翼和極左翼政黨所獲得的更多選票，這種擔心并非沒有道理。但在將近20年的逆境中，日本人卻從未與政治極端主義有染。
這可能是因為他們在應對經濟困難方面，比外國人有時承認的要強得多。例如，《經濟學人》(Economist)雜志有時會抱怨日本“讓人失望的能力驚人”。確實，外國投資者會發現, 過去20年里日本股市尤其令人失望；日經指數目前僅略高于10500點，而泡沫鼎盛時期曾達到過39000點的峰值。日本人還曾因不愿更冷酷地處理“僵尸 ”公司、執著于“終生雇用”等過時傳統而受到外人的詬病。
但是緩沖經濟衰退最嚴重社會影響的努力收到了成效。上周新聞媒體上出現了令人震驚的標題，宣稱全球衰退導致日本失業率創下新高——5.7%。但與美國及歐元地區的9.4%相比，這已經算是相當好的表現。官方的數字背后，或許存在許多隱藏的失業數據——但西方社會同樣如此。
日本決心保住就業崗位，這使得其勞動力市場不那么“有彈性”，也讓經濟付出了代價——但這種代價并非不可承受。學者們發表“日本將成為全球第一強國 ”的驚人預測的日子早已一去不返。但在經歷了20年的所謂停滯之后，日本依然排名第二——是全球第二大經濟體。日本的大型企業依然在制造世界一流的產品。例如，豐田在研發普銳斯(Prius)等混合動力汽車方面，就走在了世界的前列。
東京給人的感覺，的確不像一個陷入終極衰退國家的首都。東京的米其林星級餐廳比巴黎還要多。英國《金融時報》的時尚宗師泰勒•布律萊(Tyler Brûlé) 徜徉在東京街頭，不知疲倦地搜尋前沿設計的范本——這是在向日本的時尚聲譽致敬。日本2002年主辦世界杯時，“失落的十年”剛剛過去，日本向世界呈現出一副歡樂而好客的面孔，相比于其聯合主辦國韓國怪異的民族主義，顯得格外討喜。日本人的足球踢得也不錯。日本國家隊赴北京參加了2004年亞洲杯的決賽，擊敗了東道主中國隊——而且還活著離開了中國。
當然，日本有其自身的問題。其人口平均年齡正穩步上升，而人口總數逐漸減少。每5個日本人中，就有一個年齡超過65歲。民主黨已承諾將提高養老金和父母的育兒補貼，并采取減稅措施。但很難想象日本政府如何實現收支平衡。當英美兩國擔心其公共債務可能達到國內生產總值(GDP)的80%時，日本的債務卻正逐漸接近GDP的200%。
日本應對社會老齡化的一些努力也讓人不安。在研發給老年人做伴的機器人方面，該國一直處于世界領先水平。其中包括一款“溫暖體貼的Ifbot”，據媒體報道，這種機器人“身著宇航服，會談論天氣、唱歌和做游戲。”
最好不要嘲笑他們。美國和歐洲正疲于應對泡沫經濟、公共債務不斷上升和嬰兒潮(baby-boom)一代退休帶來的后果，他們應該懷著尊敬的心情向日本取經。日本的現在，可能就是他們的未來。
世界的な景気後退が昨年始まった時、日本の経験は欧米にとって恐ろしい教訓になると言われていた。未曾有の経済危機を前に米国や欧州連合（EU）が正しい政策を実行しなければ、欧米も日本のような「失われた10年」を経験し、そのあとも日本のように何年も経済成長率が伸びないおぼつかない状態が続いてしまうのだと、当時よく言われていた。
その日本はここへきて30日の選挙で、50年以上続いた自民党長期政権に決別し、民主党を与党に選んだ。おかげで今や欧米では、新しい「日本がたり」が繰り広げられている。いわくこれは「政治的な革命」なのだとか。あるいはこれで日本は何年も続いた停滞の日々に別れを告げられる、これは日本にとって大きなチャンスなのだとか。
しかしどちらの「日本がたり」も、間違っている。民主党は実は、そこまで大きく日本を変えたりしないだろうし、そうするべきではないからだ。というのも過去20年間の日本の物語は、欧米の論調が言いたがるほど惨めなものでは決してなかったのだから。
確かに1990年に資産バブルが弾けてからというもの、日本経済はのろのろとしか成長せず、株式市場は下落、財政赤字は恐ろしいほどの額にふくれあがった。けれどもこうした困難があったにせよ、日本はその後もずっと正気で、安定していて、豊かで、エキサイティングな国であり続けた。政治的にも文化的にも、そして経済的な意味でさえも、日本は欧米にとって警鐘どころではない。むしろ長く苦しい時代をどうやって乗り越えるかのヒントとなる、日本は見事なお手本なのだ。
相対的な経済停滞が続いている間ずっと、日本の有権者が繰り返し自民党を与党に選び続けたことは、多くの外国人を当惑させた。それは日本がある意味で民主的な国とは言いきれないからだ――などという意見もあった。しかし日本は変わろうとしていた。変わろうとする意志はあった。たとえば日本はあの派手で華やかな小泉純一郎氏を信任したのだ。おかげで小泉氏は2001年から2008年にかけて、日本を以前よりも自由市場主義的な方向へ引っ張ることができた。そして日本は今度は、小泉氏ほどアメリカ流に傾倒していない、鳩山由紀夫氏と民主党を選んだのだ。
しかし日本が変化を選ぶとき、それは常に一定範囲内での変化にとどまるものと相場は決まっている。たとえば欧米の発想からすると、ひどい不況は過激な政治運動を引き起こしかねないという懸念がある。アメリカ政治の論調は時にそれぐらいヒステリックだし、欧州では極右や極左の政党が票数を伸ばしているから、心配するだけのことはある。しかし20年近くにわたる苦しい時代を経ても、日本は一度たりとも、過激主義に浮気することはなかった。
というのも（外国人はなかなか認めようとしないが）、日本は実は言われているよりはずっと上手に、厳しい経済状況に対応してきたからだ。たとえば英「エコノミスト」誌はたびたび、日本の「人をがっかりさせる才能は見事なものだ」などと書いてきた。確かに外国人投資家にとっては、日本の株式市場はここ20年ほど、がっかりする場所だっただろう。なにせバブルのピークには3万9000円をつけていた日経平均株価が、今は1万500円かそこらなのだから。日本人はそのほかにも、いわゆる「死に体」企業をもっと情け容赦なく処理しようとしないとか、いつまでも「終身雇用制度」のような古くさい慣習にしがみついていると、外国人からやたらと非難されてきた。
しかし日本は景気後退の最もひどい社会的影響のショックをなんとか和らげようと努力してきたのであって、その努力はちゃんと成果を出した。確かに先週には世界不況のせいで日本の失業率が過去最悪の5.7％になってしまった、これは大変なことだという論調の見出しが各紙を飾った。しかし5.7％というのは過去最悪と言っても、米国やユーロ圏の9.4％に比べればかなりマシな数字だ。確かにおそらく、公式の失業率の背後には見えない失業が潜んでいるのだろうが、それは欧米でも同じことだ。
日本人は自分たちの職を必死で守ろうとした。だから労働市場はやや硬直的だったし、経済成長はその代償を払う羽目になった……が、それは耐えられないほどの大きな代償ではなかった。学者たちが息せき切って「ジャパン・アズ・ナンバーワン」などと論文を次々と書いていた時代はとっくの昔に終わった。それでも、日本経済は停滞していると20年間言われ続けながらも、日本は未だに世界2位の経済大国なのだ。日本の大企業は未だに、世界で有数の競争力を誇る製品を作り続けている。たとえばトヨタ自動車は、プリウスのように、ハイブリッド自動車の開発で世界をリードしてきた。
そして東京という街はとてもではないが、慢性的な不況に陥っている国の首都とは思えない。東京のレストランはパリよりもたくさんミシュランの星をとりまくったし、フィナンシャル・タイムズのスタイル専門家、タイラー・ブリュレはひたすら東京のあちこちを歩き回っては、最先端のデザインを見つけてくる。日本がいかにスタイリッシュな国か、世界的な評価は正しいのだ。いわゆる「失われた10年」の直後に、日本が2002年のサッカー・ワールドカップを主催した時には、実に明るく、実に温かい歓迎ぶりで世界を迎え入れてくれた。共催国・韓国の薄気味悪い愛国主義とは、嬉しいほどに対照的だったのだ。それに日本人は、サッカーもできる。日本代表は2004年のアジア杯決勝戦のため北京入りして、そして無事に生還してきた。
もちろん日本にも問題はある。平均寿命はひたすら伸び続けていて、人口は減り続けている。日本人の5人に1人は65歳を超えているのだ。民主党は年金の支給額や育児手当を増やすと約束している。加えて減税も。どうやったらその計算が成り立つのか、よく分からない。今の米英は、自分たちの公的債務が国内総生産（GDP）の80％に達してしまいそうだと心配しているのだが、日本の公的債務は200％に近づきつつある。
日本は確かに高齢化社会の問題に取り組もうとしているが、その対策の一部ははっきり言って気持ちが悪い。たとえば日本は、お年寄りの世話をする介護ロボット開発で、世界の先頭を走っている。介護ロボット「よりそいイフボット」は、報道を信じるなら「宇宙服を着て、天気の話をしてくれて、歌を歌い、ゲームをする」のだそうだ。
笑っている場合ではない。アメリカやヨーロッパは今や、バブル経済のその後の惨状に直面し、財政赤字の拡大や団塊世代の大量退職に直面しているのだから。むしろ敬意をこめて日本を見つめるべきだ。日本こそ、自分たちの未来の姿かもしれないのだから。
Japan’s continuity we can believe in
When the great recession began last year, the fate of Japan was often held up as an awful warning to the west. If the US and the European Union failed to adopt the right policies, it was said, they too might suffer a Japanese-style “lost decade”, followed by years of feeble growth.
Now that the Japanese have used Sunday’s election to elect the Democratic party – breaking with more than 50 years of rule by the Liberal Democratic party – a new western narrative is taking hold. This is a political revolution; it is Japan’s big chance to break with the years of stagnation.
But both these stories are wrong. The Democrats are unlikely to shake things up hugely. Nor should they. For the story of Japan over the past 20 years is by no means as dismal as much western commentary would have it.
It is true that, since its asset-price bubble burst in 1990, the country’s economy has grown slowly, the stock market has slumped and national debt has risen to awesome proportions. But, despite these trials, it has remained a sane, stable, prosperous and exciting country. Politically, culturally and even economically, it offers not so much a warning as an inspiring example of how to deal with a long period of adversity.
The fact that, throughout the years of relative stagnation, the Japanese kept electing the LDP puzzled many outsiders. A few even saw it as evidence that Japan is somehow less than democratic. But it was willing to try and change. The country gave a mandate to Junichiro Koizumi, the flamboyant LDP prime minister, who pushed Japan in a more free-market direction from 2001 to 2006. Now it has turned to Yukio Hatoyama and the Democrats, who are less enamoured of the American model.
However, Japan has always gone for change within well-defined limits. Europeans and Americans worry that a deep recession could stoke political extremism – not without reason, perhaps, given the hysterical tone of politics in the US and the increase in the vote for far-right and far-left parties in Europe. But during almost 20 years of tough times, the Japanese have never flirted with political extremism.
That could be because they have coped much better with economic difficulty than foreigners sometimes acknowledge. The Economist, for example, has occasionally lamented Japan’s “amazing ability to disappoint”. It is true that foreign investors will have found the country’s stock market a particularly disappointing venue in the past two decades; the Nikkei currently stands at a little over 10,500, compared with 39,000 at the peak of the bubble. The Japanese have also been chastised by outsiders for their reluctance to deal more ruthlessly with “zombie” companies, and for clinging to outmoded traditions such as “lifetime employment”.
But the efforts to cushion the worst social effects of an economic downturn have paid off. Last week there were shocked headlines proclaiming that the global recession had driven Japanese unemployment to a new high – 5.7 per cent. That still compares pretty favourably to 9.4 per cent in the US and the euro area. There is probably a lot of disguised unemployment behind the official number – but the same is true in the west.
The Japanese determination to preserve jobs made their labour market less “flexible” and the economy paid a price – but not an unbearable one. The days when academics wrote breathless predictions about “Japan as number one” are long gone. But after 20 years of alleged stagnation, it is still number two – the world’s second largest economy. Its biggest companies still make world-beating products. Toyota, for example, has led the world in developing hybrid cars, such as the Prius.
Tokyo certainly does not feel like the capital of a country in the grip of terminal depression. The city’s restaurants have accumulated more Michelin stars than are to be found in Paris. Tyler Brûlé, the Financial Times style guru, prowls the streets of the city, searching relentlessly for examples of cutting-edge design – a tribute to the country’s reputation for style. When Japan hosted the soccer World Cup in 2002, just after its “lost decade”, it presented a cheerful and welcoming face to the world that contrasted pleasantly with the spooky nationalism of its South Korean co-hosts. The Japanese can even play soccer. The national team went to Beijing for the final of the 2004 Asian cup, beat China – and got out of the country alive.
Of course, Japan has its problems. Its average age is rising steadily and its population is shrinking. One in five Japanese is over 65. The Democrats have promised to raise pensions and payments to parents – and to cut taxes. It is hard to see how the sums add up. While the US and the UK worry that their public-sector debts could hit 80 per cent of gross domestic product, Japan’s debt is heading for 200 per cent.
Some of its efforts to deal with an ageing society are positively unnerving. The country has led the world in developing robots as companions for the elderly. These include a “snuggling Ifbot” that, according to press reports, “lives in an astronaut suit, chats about the weather, sings and plays games”.
It is best not to laugh. As the US and Europe struggle to come to terms with the aftermath of a bubble economy, rising public debt and the retirement of the baby-boom generation, they should look to Japan with respect. It may be the future.
日本并未衰落
去年，當這場大衰退開始之際，人們常常把日本的遭遇，作為給西方的一個可怕警告。他們說，如果美國和歐盟(EU)未能采取正確的政策，或許也會遭遇日本式“失落的十年”，其后則是多年的增長疲弱。
如今，當日本人在上周日的選舉中結束了自民黨(LDP) 50多年的統治，把民主黨(DPJ)送上臺時，西方又出現了一種新的說法：此次選舉是一場政治革命，是日本結束多年停滯局面的重大機會。
然而，這兩種說法都是錯誤的。民主黨不太可能大幅改變現狀。他們也不應該這樣做。因為日本過去20多年來的境遇，決不像許多西方人描述得那么悲慘。
誠然，自1990年日本資產價格泡沫破滅以來，該國經濟增長緩慢，股市大幅下跌，國家債務在GDP中所占比例攀升至可怕的水平。但是，盡管面臨這些困難，日本仍然是一個理智、穩定、繁榮和令人激動的國家。就政治、文化、甚至經濟而言，與其說日本提供了一個教訓，不如說它在如何應對長期逆境方面樹立了一個令人鼓舞的榜樣。
令許多局外人感到困惑的是，在經濟陷入相對停滯的多年時間里，日本人始終選擇由自民黨執政。少數人士甚至把這作為日本不夠民主的證據。但日本樂于做出嘗試和改變。它曾選擇個性張揚的自民黨成員小泉純一郎(Junichiro Koizumi)擔任首相，后者在2001年至2006年間，推動日本走向了更高程度的自由市場化。如今，它轉而選擇了不那么迷戀美國模式的鳩山由紀夫 (Yukio Hatoyama)和民主黨。
不過，日本始終是在明確界定的限度內尋求改變。歐洲人和美國人擔心，嚴重的經濟衰退可能會助長政治極端主義——考慮到美國出現的歇斯底里的政治論調，以及歐洲極右翼和極左翼政黨所獲得的更多選票，這種擔心并非沒有道理。但在將近20年的逆境中，日本人卻從未與政治極端主義有染。
這可能是因為他們在應對經濟困難方面，比外國人有時承認的要強得多。例如，《經濟學人》(Economist)雜志有時會抱怨日本“讓人失望的能力驚人”。確實，外國投資者會發現, 過去20年里日本股市尤其令人失望；日經指數目前僅略高于10500點，而泡沫鼎盛時期曾達到過39000點的峰值。日本人還曾因不愿更冷酷地處理“僵尸 ”公司、執著于“終生雇用”等過時傳統而受到外人的詬病。
但是緩沖經濟衰退最嚴重社會影響的努力收到了成效。上周新聞媒體上出現了令人震驚的標題，宣稱全球衰退導致日本失業率創下新高——5.7%。但與美國及歐元地區的9.4%相比，這已經算是相當好的表現。官方的數字背后，或許存在許多隱藏的失業數據——但西方社會同樣如此。
日本決心保住就業崗位，這使得其勞動力市場不那么“有彈性”，也讓經濟付出了代價——但這種代價并非不可承受。學者們發表“日本將成為全球第一強國 ”的驚人預測的日子早已一去不返。但在經歷了20年的所謂停滯之后，日本依然排名第二——是全球第二大經濟體。日本的大型企業依然在制造世界一流的產品。例如，豐田在研發普銳斯(Prius)等混合動力汽車方面，就走在了世界的前列。
東京給人的感覺，的確不像一個陷入終極衰退國家的首都。東京的米其林星級餐廳比巴黎還要多。英國《金融時報》的時尚宗師泰勒•布律萊(Tyler Brûlé) 徜徉在東京街頭，不知疲倦地搜尋前沿設計的范本——這是在向日本的時尚聲譽致敬。日本2002年主辦世界杯時，“失落的十年”剛剛過去，日本向世界呈現出一副歡樂而好客的面孔，相比于其聯合主辦國韓國怪異的民族主義，顯得格外討喜。日本人的足球踢得也不錯。日本國家隊赴北京參加了2004年亞洲杯的決賽，擊敗了東道主中國隊——而且還活著離開了中國。
當然，日本有其自身的問題。其人口平均年齡正穩步上升，而人口總數逐漸減少。每5個日本人中，就有一個年齡超過65歲。民主黨已承諾將提高養老金和父母的育兒補貼，并采取減稅措施。但很難想象日本政府如何實現收支平衡。當英美兩國擔心其公共債務可能達到國內生產總值(GDP)的80%時，日本的債務卻正逐漸接近GDP的200%。
日本應對社會老齡化的一些努力也讓人不安。在研發給老年人做伴的機器人方面，該國一直處于世界領先水平。其中包括一款“溫暖體貼的Ifbot”，據媒體報道，這種機器人“身著宇航服，會談論天氣、唱歌和做游戲。”
最好不要嘲笑他們。美國和歐洲正疲于應對泡沫經濟、公共債務不斷上升和嬰兒潮(baby-boom)一代退休帶來的后果，他們應該懷著尊敬的心情向日本取經。日本的現在，可能就是他們的未來。
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